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and

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bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR

Vol. II August 1955 No. 8

ARTICLES

A Climatic Survey of Russian Agriculture

W. P. von Poletika

The view is frequently expressed that Russia is a country full of unexhausted and inexhaustible resources, especially as far as agriculture is concerned. This conception of the possibilities of further agricultural development has its origin in the legendary fertility of the chernozem black earth in the Ukraine. We distinguish between four main type of chernozem according to the humus content, which varies from 10 to 16% in the case of heavy chernozem to 5 to 3,5% in the southern parts. This soil is indeed the most fertile type in Russia, but its potential fertility is considerably limited by lack of water. Most parts of the black earth belt belong to the semi-arid or even arid climatic areas with irregular or insufficient rainfall. The annual rainfall varies also in the black earth area; in Eastern Europe it is 500 to 300 mm, within Western Siberia 400 to 200 mm. The characteristics of the region are also uneven. Especially in the Asian part of the Soviet Union for instance, it is very saline. The average yield of grain on the best black earth amounts therefore only to about 800 to 1200 kilograms per hectare and is in addition subject to considerable fluctuation owing to sporadic periods of drought and hot, dry descending winds, called *Suhovey*. Fertilizer is unprofitable because of the dryness of the soil, and the Ukrainian peasant saying that fertilizer is the enemy of the black earth is quite justified. For the most part the black earth region is an area of extensive grain cultivation and suffers considerably from soil erosion and exhaustion..

In addition to the erroneous conception regarding the fertility of the chernozem, the agricultural area is likewise generally considered to be immensely vast and capable of unlimited expansion. This conception is also false. We must always bear in mind that the agricultural area as well as the agricultural potential of the Soviet Union is determined less by soil conditions than by climate. A good farmer can in some cases improve bad soils, but he is as good as powerless in the face of bad climatic conditions. When we hear that in the USSR out of a total area of 22 million square kilometers only 1.5 million square kilometers

(bare 7%) are under the plow, we ask ourselves whether nature (climate and soil) does not exert a limiting influence on the extent of arable land.

To clarify this question, the Russian area of cultivation must be examined above all from a climatic point of view. The chart on page 7 shows the main area of grain cultivation. The greatest density is in the European part of the Soviet Union. The main grain area forms a wedge tapering to the east with its base on the line from Leningrad to Odessa, the axis going through the southern Urals to western Siberia. Where it meets the highlands of central Siberia, the wedge ends. The border areas of the Soviet Union in the north, south and far east lie outside the wedge and need not be taken into account as they are only of little importance to Russian grain production.

Inside this wedge the proportion of cropland is, however, by no means even. Rather it becomes less in an west to east direction and also from north to south. Other agrarian factors also run parallel to the density of cultivation, such as the density of the farming population, the productivity of the soil, the size and profitability of the agricultural undertakings and the cost of the land (before the Revolution).

The Center of Russian Agriculture

The main part of the wedge, situated in Eastern Europe is the center of Russian agriculture. Here, on something less than one fifth of the territory of the state, is concentrated more than four fifths of the total population of Russia, four fifths of the total crop land and more than four fifths of the total agricultural production. It accounts for most of the grain production as bread consumption provides, in caloric value, more than 70% of the food consumed by Soviet people. In spite of the fact that the borders of the main agricultural area cannot be sharply defined, a schematic division of the Russian territory into agricultural and non-agricultural land, in a proportion of one to five is possible. This division is a result of the natural and above all of the climatic conditions. Its consequences were and still are serious, fateful and often disastrous. This geographical discrepancy explains the agricultural and population paradox in Russia, but does not alter the fact that the western parts of the agricultural center are heavily overpopulated (over 100 persons per square kilometer) because of their better soil and climatic conditions. At the same time the general density of population is only nine per square kilometer on account of the vast, almost uncolonized, areas in the inimical expanses of Siberia, northern Russia and elsewhere. However, this area, comprising over 15 million square kilometers, must nevertheless be industrially exploited by the rest of the country because of its resources. That is the curse and the tragedy of this natural discrepancy of Russian economic geography.

The Natural Location of Agriculture

The Russian center of agriculture has had a definite location determined by the natural characteristics of the land and of climate. We can now inquire

whether the geographical position, the extent and the shape of the main agricultural area are entirely the result of historical accident or whether they can be explained by the geography of Russia and its main factor: climate. In this connection the fact that the Russian center of agriculture extends from west to east in the shape of a wedge is by no means due to an accident of history. The agricultural colonization by man has usually been carried out in the temperate zones of the earth from west to east or vice versa, and has mainly developed in strips in the same degrees of latitude. A colonization in other, far different degrees of latitude seldom took place and then only as a secondary phenomenon.

The center of agriculture occupies the middle of those geographical areas or of those climatic soil and plant zones which extend from west to east (see chart on page 7). In the main they are the geographical areas of the deciduous and mixed forest, of the forest steppe land and of an important part of the steppe, which, together with the center of agriculture form a wedge between the taiga (coniferous forest) and the tundra (cold, unforested desert) on the one hand, and the dry steppe and hot desert on the other, and "drive them apart," so to speak, to the north and the south. Corresponding to the natural geographical divisions of Soviet territory agriculture can develop only within definite geographical zones as follows:

	Area in Square Kilometers
Deciduous Forest and Mixed Forest Zone	1,100,000
Forest Steppe Zone	1,900,000
Steppe Zone	1,400,000
Total	4,400,000

According to more precise calculations by Professor S. N. Prokopovicz who is completely in agreement with my *Theorie der russischen Agrarmetropole*, first published in 1927, the following were the population and cultivation statistics for these three geographical zones before World War II:[1]

Cultivated Area (Million Square Kilometers)	4.37
Proportion of Total Territory (Percent)	20.50
Rural Population per Square Kilometer of Cultivated Area	21.40
Rural Population of Cultivated Area (Million)	93,50
Proportion of Rural Population of Cultivated Area to Total Rural Population (Percent)	81.60
Cultivated Area Inside Agricultural Area (Million Square Kilometers)	1.096
Proportion of Total Cultivated Area (Percent)	80.00
Proportion of Total Area of Agricultural Area (Percent)	25.10
Extent of Cultivation per 100 Rural Inhabitants of Agricultural Area (Hectares)	116.4

These statistics correspond to the above-mentioned examples given in round figures.

The zones in the middle, together with the agrarian centers attached to them, form the sphere influenced by the Atlantic climate and, like the rest of

[1] S. N. Prokopovicz, *Die natürlichen Hilfsquellen der UdSSR*, Zürich-New York, 1944.

Europe, owe their fertility to the warmth and humidity of the Gulf Stream, which are brought by the prevailing westerly winds. The European form of agriculture (cultivation by plow) is also a result of the effects of the Gulf Stream. This is the fundamental natural and climatic reason for the cultural orientation and the striving of Russia towards Europe and the Atlantic.

The climatic limit of the main agricultural area for grain cultivation is determined in the north by lack of warmth and in the south by lack of water. The area included comprises roughly the above-mentioned natural divisions in the middle of eastern Europe.

The Climatic Limits of Grain Cultivation

In the north the limit of the European Type of agriculture is determined by lack of heat, accompanied by sufficient or even superfluous moisture. It corresponds roughly to a limit of the sum of daily mean temperature during the growing season between 1500° and 1600° C.

$$\Sigma\, t_{10^0} = 1500^0 \text{ to } 1600^0$$

Such an amount of warmth with a mean daily temperature not below 10° C in the course of the growing season is the minimum for the ripening of barley, grain in the north requiring the least total temperature. It determines the "cold limit" of the agricultural area.

In the south the limit for agriculture is determined by lack of moisture with sufficient or superfluous warmth. It runs through the dry steppe with a water deficiency, where the potential evaporation in greater than the rainfall after allowing for run-off. The general (simplified) formula for the water balance is

$$\text{rainfall} = \text{drainage} + \text{evaporation}$$

In view of the low moisture content of the air and of the soil in the arid steppe region (climatic zone of insufficient moisture) the potential evaporation is very great and considerably exceeds the actual evaporation from a similar surface on the Continent. This can be expressed in the following manner:

$$E_{pot} = R - D$$

This is, reduced to a short formula, the critical factor in the arid areas, especially in the desert. Among other things it determines in general the lack of forests in the steppe, and not the contrary, as is often assumed.

The southern "dry limit" of Soviet agriculture is roughly determined by the isogram of the expression

$$C = \frac{\Sigma R}{\Sigma \frac{t_{10^0}}{10}}$$

where C represents the hydrothermic climatic coefficient (according to Selaninov), R the rainfall and $\Sigma\, t_{10^0}$ the sum of daily mean temperatures during the growing season with a daily average temperature not under 10° C. The

Agricultural Areas and Geographical Divisions of the USSR

negative water balance occurs when $C < 1$. The area of unstable agriculture lies south of the gram for $C < 0{,}7$ which is also the northern limit of the dry steppe. The northern limit of the semi-desert begins where $C < 0{,}5$ and that of the desert where $C < 0{,}3$.

The above-mentioned climatic delineations of the agricultural area are, however, more theoretical than practical. They are based on the *average* temperature and rainfall totals and do not take into account the fact that variations in individual years can be much greater. The considerable and frequent variations from the average limit the agrarian area even more, especially in southern Russia on account of its great aridity.

The area of cultivation is further limited in the north and the south by unsuitable soils. We often find in the north very boggy, acid soils, and in the south a high degree of salinity, too little humus, a large proportion of sand and, in the steppe, considerable erosion. Even under otherwise favorable climatic conditions this useless land renders an extension of agriculture and an expansion of the cultivated area impossible. At best, progress can be made only by large-scale drainage and irrigation.

Apart from the limits imposed on agriculture of the European type, an even narrower, economic limit may be assumed. Agriculture cannot be extended beyond a limit within which the yield ensures to some extent the economic well-being or at least the nutrition of the farmer, i. e. the work must be worthwhile. Land lying outside this economic limit does not justify the work the farmer puts into it, as it cannot guarantee a return.

The Further Development of Agricultural Production

The negative effect of the climate on an increase in agricultural production can be seen in the fact that the climate, in conjunction with soil conditions and the profitableness of the undertakings, places a nearly categorical limit to the extension of the center of agriculture into the inimical territory of the Asiatic areas. The same applies to more intensive farming[2] in large parts of the center of agriculture itself, especially the arid areas in the south-east, where the so-called granary of Russia is located. (In general it is, as we shall see, a very unreliable granary, which, however—in good years— provides a surplus).

In spite of this, there are only two ways of achieving a decisive increase in agricultural production: intensive farming inside the center of agriculture and the extension of the limits of the center of agriculture. In both cases the climatic obstacles are extremely great. It is true that the center of agricultural suffers from the same extremes of continental climate (lack of water and excess of heat in the southern and southeastern part) as the border areas of the center of agriculture, but not in such an extreme form. At the same time it is easier from the point of view of intensive farming to combat the lack of water in the

[2] "Intensive Farming" should be understood in this connection as a general term for all measures for increasing production (especially reclamation of land by melioration, drainage, irrigation, etc. within the center of agriculture) and not so much in the sense of "intensification" by improving the methods of farming and the organization of labor.

steppe area of the south than the lack of heat in the north. In 1948 the Soviet government, after long and not very successful attempts to extend cultivation northwards (for instance the cultivation of wheat and cotton also within the center of agriculture), was compelled to adopt extraordinary measures of intensification and extension of agriculture in the dry steppe. The arid nature of the steppe is to be changed by afforestation (planting wind-breaking forest strips) and various other means of improving the soil. In addition, five large irrigation projects have been started in the dry steppe of the European part of the Soviet Union since 1951 in accordance with the provisions of the Fifth Five-Year Plan. In this way it is intended to stabilize the yield of the granary of Russia and to gain new land within the center of agriculture. If all the labor of the farming population is utilized to the full, the afforestation of the steppe promises if not speedy, nevertheless partial success in a reasonable time in the forest steppe area, where trees can still grow, but on no account in the dry steppe. Theoretically there is nothing to prevent an irrigation of the dry steppe if water is available. However, there are enormous technical difficulties to be overcome, and the tremendous costs would make grain cultivation in this area the most costly in the world. It can nevertheless be assumed that no price is too high for the Soviet Union when it is a question of improving the position of Soviet agriculture and the nutrition of the population.

Thus climatic and soil conditions are the basic reason why the reserve of free land with reasonable agricultural value within the Russian center of agriculture is extraordinarily small and in part practically exhausted, or is unusable due to undeveloped communications and organization. This was, however, already the case before the Revolution of 1917, as is shown by the almost negligible increase in the area of cultivation since 1914, which could hardly keep pace with the rapid increase of population and the considerable urbanization in spite of the very great efforts of the Soviet government and the forced labor of the rural population. The following table (taken from Prokopovicz and supplemented by the author) illustrates this:

Population, Crop Land and Grain Production

(1914—1938 = Old Soviet Frontiers, 1950 = New Soviet Frontiers)

	1914	1922	1927	1938	1950
Total Population (Million)	139.3	131.7	147.0	170.5	200.0
Rural Population (Million)	114.6	110.5	120.7	114.6	133.0•
Rural Population Engaged in Agriculture (Million)	97.3	105.7	114.8	90.8•	110.0•
Total Crop Land (Million Hectares)	105.0	77.7	112.4	136.9	156.5*
Total Crop Land per capita of Agricultural Population (Hectares)	1.08	0.74	0.98	1.51	1.42
Total Crop Land per capita of Total Population (Hectares)	0.75	0.59	0.76	0.80	0.78
Total Grain Area (Million Hectares)	94.4	66.2	94.7	102.4	113.2
Total per capita Grain Area (Hectares)	0.68	0.49	0.63	0.60	0.57
Total Grain Production (Million Metric Tons)	80.10	56.27	72.80	80.74	90.31
Total per capita Grain Production (Kilograms)	5.80	4.20	4.80	4.70	4.50

• Estimated figures.
* Planned figures for 1950.

This is rather striking evidence that the reserve of land suitable for agriculture inside the center of agriculture is in fact almost exhausted, in spite of the enormous unused areas.

Because the method of intensive farming and land reclamation cannot meet the growing agricultural requirements of the USSR, the extension of the cultivated area to territories as yet undeveloped and unsuitable for agriculture becomes inevitable. Apart from the extension of the irrigated area in the Aral and Caspian deserts and semi-deserts in the south, the agricultural development of the Siberian land of the future will be the first objective. This land, which because of its rich mineral resources is being developed as the center of an enormous heavy industry, is completely dependent for food supplies on long lines of communication which are extremely vulnerable in wartime as it completely lacks an agrarian hinterland. In this case the old methods of cultivation, even if applied on a gigantic scale, would not be sufficient. Naturally, clearing, drainage and soil improvement are necessary on a large scale. However, the cold desert of the taiga lacks heat above all, and in eastern Siberia lacks water during the short growing season.

In the beginning, cultivation would have to be confined to the intensive growing of vegetables and possibly also of fruit. In this case the provision of the necessary gigantic hothouses and protected beds would certainly be technically possible, but they would involve tremendous costs. For this purpose the abundant supplies of wood and peat in the taiga could be used for heating and lighting the installations. It is also possible for these supplies of wood and peat to be used at the same time as the basis for the large-scale production of cellulose for industrial and feeding purposes, as experiments in Germany have already partly shown. In this case cattle-raising, which, compared with crop cultivation, suffers less in winter and is therefore more wide-spread in Siberia, acquires a greater importance.

It will, however, not be possible to carry out grain cultivation in these territories more extensively and on a wider scale until, by tedious and prolonged breeding experiments, types of grain with a greater resistance to cold and a considerably shorter growing season have been successfully produced or until atomic energy is available cheaply and in great quantities. The difference in price between the agricultural products produced on the spot and those transported from a great distance would probably be only of secondary importance within the planned and controlled economy of the Soviet Union.

Seen from this point of view, the picture of the future of Siberian agriculture in the form of a close coexistence of foresty, cattle-raising and crop cultivation directly connected with the already existing, but extremely scattered industrial towns, is not improbable. However, as A. Penck has remarked there will never be a continuous settlement in the European fashion. Rather will it be necessary to create "oases of warmth" for plant cultivation in the damp cold taiga of the Soviet North, similar to the water oases of the hot, dry desert of the Soviet South.

Fluctuations of the Annual Total Grain Production in European Russia 1883—1914

(Average Production for the Period = 100)



Deviations from the Average Production:

———— For the Whole of European Russia with 50 Former Provinces

– – – – – For the Black Earth Zone (Steppe)

..... For the Non-Black Earth Zone (Forest Zone and Parts of the Forest-Steppe)

The Russian Soil Yield as a Factor in Agrarian Policy

The effect of natural factors on Russian agriculture and consequently on agrarian policy is especially noticeable in the soil yield. In the strongly centralized organization and agrarian methods, of the Soviet collective farm system the dependence of the soil yield (especially of grain cultivation as the basis of agriculture) on the natural factors of climate and soil may be distinctly seen. The yield of the Soviet soils has two characteristics: it is variable and it is low, almost the lowest in the world. Its distribution over time and space is, in spite of certain general laws, continentally inconstant (see chart on page 11). As a general rule it should be noted that the soil yield decreases from west to east together with warmth and humidity. At the same time it becomes less from the middle axis of the center-of-agriculture wedge towards the north following the decrease in warmth and towards the south with the increasing aridity.

Just as we can roughly divide the whole Soviet territory into an agrarian and a non-agrarian area, the center of agriculture itself can also be roughly divided into a wooded and a steppe zone as regards yield. In the wooded zone the yield is higher and more stable and the potential yield is considerably more than in the steppe zone (agriculture is carried on without irrigation). The highest, but not the most stable yield is to be found in the forest-steppe zone. It is considered (with the greatest probability) to be the Eastern Slavic cradle of the European form of agriculture with the plow.

Roughly along the line of the wooded steppe runs another dividing line which separates the agricultural zones of the Soviet Union into two areas: one is the area of underproduction, which includes in the main the woodland with its insufficient production of grain for the local (dense) population; the other is the area of overproduction, which is concentrated mainly in the steppe and forest-steppe zone. In this division the yield naturally plays a great part, but the density of the rural population and the degree of urbanization of the various areas are also of importance. This area of overproduction is the so-called granary of Russia. At the same time its soil yield is low and subject to considerable variations (see chart on page 11), as is typical for the arid steppe. The extensive grain cultivation in this area is, on the part of the farmer, a regular game of chance with the drought, a game he can win only on the traditional basis of economic endurance through the accumulation of grain reserves for several years.

Other measures in the fight against the drought in the steppe consist mainly of the intensification of grain cultivation. These methods were most strikingly employed in the already-mentioned campaign for changing the aridity of the steppe by afforestation and irrigation. These projects require high and inevitably risky capital investments such as cannot be borne by small farms, and are only possible under the specific conditions of the Soviet kolkhoz organization and by the cheap methods of labor organization which are unknown to a free economy.

Atomic Defense in the Soviet Army

V. Pozdnyakov

The problems of atomic defense are new to all armies, and a heavy veil of secrecy surrounds the whole subject. This is particularly true in the case of the Soviet Army. Even in Soviet military and specialist literature, material on the use of atomic weapons and defense against them is seldom included. It is highly unlikely that the Soviet armed forces have a complete system of atomic defense, for there have been too few atomic explosions in the USSR to permit practical deductions to be established. It is, therefore, impossible to give a complete picture of the Soviet Army's atomic defense measures. However, individual details, the general trend of the development of atomic weapons and a number of concrete measures being taught the Soviet Army can be established.

In discussing the problem we are not attempting to present new material on the subject itself, but rather to show what the Soviet leaders have found fitting or necessary to tell their people. Thus, the sole source is Russian military magazines and newspapers, specialized literature and broadcasts from the army station *Radio Volga.*

The Soviet Army has gone over from general, theoretical considerations to a practical study of concrete methods of defense and has even begun training its troops in their use. At the same time, the views of the Soviet Union's probable enemies on tactics to be employed when atomic devices have been brought into operation are being studied and made known to the Soviet troops. From this, Soviet tactics are being worked out both in theory and in practice. In this respect it may be said that atomic weapons are being introduced into the daily life of the Army as standard equipment.

Generally speaking, the Soviet press does not publish details of the latest atom bomb's properties. Mention is usually made of bombs with an explosive force equal to 20,000 tons of TNT, even though the present atom bomb has an explosive force of up to 150,000 tons, and the hydrogen bomb even more: up to 10,000,000 tons. True, the effectiveness of the bomb is not directly proportional to the explosive force but only about 1:50, but there has nevertheless been a marked increase in destructive power. However, the impression is gained that Soviet sources are not taking these new properties of atomic weapons into consideration, and are even belittling them. This could mean that the Soviet Army is concentrating on the use of tactical atomic weapons. The large strategical weapon is probably not within the Army's competence, but is at the disposal of the country's political leaders. It appears that the Soviet High Command does not expect strategic atomic attacks.

A new word has been added to Soviet military terminology: radioactive combat agent. The Army is devising methods of using these agents, not only in the form of atomic explosions or chain nuclear reactions but directly. Although much that is published indicates that the Soviets are mainly repeating data found in the foreign press, it is only to be expected that they are working along lines of their own.

The Soviet Army's atomic defense is based on the following premises:

1. Men subjected to radioactive radiation need not be withdrawn from action.

2. Troops against whom atomic weapons have been used can continue to fulfill their duties. Consequently, atomic defense must ensure avoiding even a temporary halt to their activities.

3. Atomic defense can be organized in any tactical situation, anywhere and in any weather.

4. The basic means of atomic defense for military personnel are local natural cover and specially designed protective equipment.

5. A timely warning of an impending atomic attack would decrease losses by 50%, provided the necessary means of defense were available.

6. Reconnaissance would often permit steps to be taken to break up an atomic attack.

7. Full usage of defense facilities and personal initiative could prevent contamination.

Soviet sources consider that one of the most important elements of atomic defense is the use of special protective equipment that can be prepared in all types of battle and under any conditions. Most important is that the troops provide themselves with cover and camouflage. This would also render an attack more difficult in the first place. The Soviets note that in winter, camouflaging with white and winter coloring in general provides a certain protection from heat rays since the reflecting properties of light colors reduce the danger of burning.

Cover provides the main defense against the contaminating effects of an atomic weapon. Even open dugouts and communication trenches considerably reduce the dangers. The Soviets give the following examples:

1. Men in trenches or dugouts which cover them completely can be affected by the shock wave at a distance of 700 to 750 meters. Without any cover the radius is up to 2,400 meters.

2. The shock wave's effects on men in light, covered shelters may be only up to 400 meters from the epicenter of the explosion.

3. The effect of heat rays on men in trenches which cover them completely is noticeable only up to 400 meters, while those not under cover are affected up to 3,200 meters. Men under closed cover will not feel the effect of heat rays.

4. Men in trenches will be in danger from radiation only within 550 meters of the epicenter of the explosion, while those not under cover will be affected up to 2,000 meters. For men under closed cover the degree of contamination by radiation will depend on the thickness of the cover. Soviet sources assert that earth 120 to 130 centimeters thick or snow 140 to 150 centimeters will provide adequate protection from radiation, which at a distance of 630 metérs from the epicenter reaches a strength of 10,000 röntgens.

Data given for winter conditions may be presumed to be based on observations of Soviet atomic experiments. They include the following points:

1. A layer of packed snow 50 centimeters thick halves the dose of gamma rays. A layer of ice 25 centimeters thick has the same effect as does 15 centimeters of earth. A layer of earth one meter thick cuts down the dose of radiation to one-fortieth. Protective layers of snow and ice also considerably weaken the flow of neutrons and consequently the chance of direct radiation.

2. Freezing has no effect on the shielding properties of earth. Ground frozen when moist is more effective than dry earth.

3. Frozen earth is very effective against a shock wave if the frozen crust is firm and not less than 60 centimeters thick.

4. Trenches in snow have the same protective value as those in the earth if the snow on both sides is packed.

5. Snow cover of at least 50 centimeters in thickness ensures protection not only from the shock wave but also from heat rays. For men in covered trenches the safe distance from the point of explosion is half that for uncovered trenches.

Hollows and walled areas should be constructed to protect combat equipment. The wall should be 50 centimeters higher than the object to be protected.

Personal Defense

The most reliable means of protecting the exposed parts of the body as well as uniform, footwear and equipment from radioactive combat agents are a protective suit, a cloak, rubber gloves and stockings. An ordinary gas mask suffices to prevent radioactive substances entering the mouth, eyes or nostrils.

Soviet sources recommend means that can be found near at hand, such as a handkerchief or a gauze bandage for the mouth and nose, an overcoat, sacking, tarpaulin or beds of straw, grass or reeds.

Troops are taught that on seeing the flash of an atomic explosion they are to seek immediate shelter, be it only a shell hole, and lie face down, with the feet facing the explosion if possible. About three seconds can be allowed for this operation if the distance from the epicenter of the explosion is no less than 1,500 meters. They will then not be affected by the shock wave, which takes about 3.5 seconds to cover this distance; the dose of radiation received will not be more than 50 to 60 röntgens, which is not dangerous, and the heat rays will cause only secondary burns of the exposed parts.

In general the Soviets are very optimistic concerning heat waves. For example, they assert that foliage offers good protection, that in a forest and even in the shade of a single tree, burns are not very probable and the likelihood of large-scale forest fires is remote, as the shock wave would put out the flames.

Atomic Defense Service

The general principles of atomic defense have already been given. The troops' ability to carry out their duties in the event of an atomic attack must not be impaired. The chief elements in ensuring that they will be fit for service are:

1. Reconnaissance and observation.

2. Dosimetric check.

3. Contacting troops in contaminated areas and ensuring their removal to a safe distance.

4. Decontamination of the area and all weapons and equipment.

5. Decontamination of troops exposed to radioactive rays.

Individual personal protective measures are influenced not only by the tactical situation but also by local topographical and climatic conditions. Soviet sources stress that winter and the concomitant low temperatures make atomic defense more difficult.

Reconnaissance and Radiation Detection

The heat rays and radiation resulting from an atomic explosion will be felt within the first 10 to 15 seconds. Consequently, there is no chance of taking protracted measures. Defense will be reduced to taking cover and making use of personal protective means. Another result of the explosion will be the radioactive contamination of the area. The degree of contamination will differ, as will, therefore, the prophylactic steps taken. In any case, the measures taken must give prolonged protection.

The correct organization of the troops' actions and their provision with atomic defense is possible only if all the data of the infected area are taken into account. At the same time observation must ensure that a timely warning of an atomic attack is issued. It is considered that such a warning could reduce the number of casualties by half, providing protection were available.

In winter low temperatures and the presence of snow must be considered when carrying out radiation check and reconnaissance. The area and the air in its vicinity must be tested more frequently than in summer since a fall of snow would assist the fallout of radioactive substances from a contaminated cloud and thus increase the contamination of the ground. At the same time, a fall of snow which began after the atomic explosion would weaken radiation in the contaminated area and the fresh snow would lessen the direct contact with the radioactive substances. Consequently, the danger to troops would be considerably reduced.

In cases of frequent snowfalls combined with wind, the radioactive products produced by an explosion could be carried a considerable distance. Therefore contaminated areas can be produced both on the spot and downwind, the distance varying with the wind velocity.

All this necessitates a constant radiation check under active conditions, particularly in inclement weather. In the Soviet Army these checks are combined with chemical observations and are made by "Chemical and Radiation Observation Posts." Their staff include dosimetrists armed with radiation detection equipment.

Dosimetric Check

The dosimetric check is one of the basic methods of protecting troops from exposure to radioactive substances. It can be divided into two parts: radiation and

contamination checks. The former involves measuring the strength of rays to which troops have been exposed, and is done on the spot. The latter is carried out only after the troops have been evacuated.

Soviet sources indicate that in winter a preliminary necessity is to remove all snow from the uniform and the footwear of those being examined. They remark that winter clothing can absorb a considerable amount of radioactive substances, thereby preventing to some extent their direct contact with the body. Thus, it is recommended that the check be repeated after the outer clothing has been removed. If the degree of contamination is not high the need for a complete decontamination is obviated. However, outer clothing and footwear must be thoroughly treated or replaced.

As an additional precaution a dosimetric check is always made after the decontamination process has taken place.

In many cases troops will be obliged to cross infected areas or fight in them. It is stressed that well-trained troops can cope successfully with this task. However, the successful completion of military operations under such circumstances depends to a large extent on the infantry's close cooperation with tanks and self-propelled artillery.

A more difficult proposition is defense on contaminated ground. Soviet data are extremely meager in this respect. Troops are exhorted to be especially careful. In particular, care must be taken when moving through trenches so that contact is not made with the walls. A layer of contaminated earth 3-5 centimeters thick or of snow 10 centimeters thick must be removed from the breastwork or berm, from the sides and from the bottom of the trench, so that direct contact with radioactive substances be minimized. Although it is not stated that gas masks must be worn, it is reasonable to expect this, otherwise protection of the eyes and nostrils would be extremely difficult. When in a wood or undergrowth troops must avoid touching branches or leaves and shaking off drops of rain, snow, dew or particles of radioactive substances. During a fall of snow or rain or a dust storm the mouth, nostrils, eyes and exposed parts of the body must be carefully protected. If the use of water is essential it must first be checked.

When preparing to make an attack the most likely places at which enemy atomic defenses are to be met must be established so that the most convenient route through the area can be mapped. It is stated quite categorically that contaminated areas detected during an attack must not be allowed to interfere with action.

On the technique of crossing affected areas the following points are given: Since the longer the stay the greater the danger of contamination, speed is essential. Clearly, the use of vehicles is the best method, although all vents must be closed and weapon muzzles covered. The troops being carried are to be completely covered and wear gas masks.

When on contaminated territory troops must not sit or lie on the ground or snow except on a coat or special cover. If it is necessary to lie down or dig in, the top layer must again be removed and covered with non-contaminated earth or snow.

Decontamination

Following an atomic explosion the area and everything not under cover could be contaminated and all machinery and equipment could be dangerous. In addition to the magnitude and proximity of the explosion, meteorological conditions play an important part in the degree of contamination found in an area. Rain and snow facilitate the rapid fallout of radioactive elements from the clouds which form as a result of the atomic explosion. Because of this, contamination in the immediate vicinity of the explosion can be greatly enhanced. Moreover, the direction and force of the wind are of great importance. If the wind is moderate to strong, contaminated dust and snow can penetrate the visors and vents of vehicles and tanks.

Radioactive agents must be removed from the surface of equipment and weapons at the first opportunity. Soviet sources note that at the moment there are no known chemical antidotes. The Soviet Army uses non-freezing liquid decontaminants, of which little is known, solvents and other liquid agents. These include gasoline, kerosene and Diesel oil. This entails the subsequent careful cleaning and oiling of any metal surface, as some solvents, such as dichloroethane, are corrosive.

Decontamination can be either partial or complete, depending on the military situation. Partial decontamination is given under combat conditions, and the articles treated are those with which troops will come into contact in the performance of their duties. Complete decontamination can be carried out only at the discretion of the commanding officer after the battle or, on occasion, during a protracted lull in the fighting. Articles to be treated are sent to a decontamination point.

First in the process of partial decontamination is the removal of all snow, mud or dust, preferably with a straw broom. Then the surface is wiped two or three times with a rag soaked in a solvent. In winter the ice must also be removed.

A complete decontamination of weapons and equipment is made by wiping the surfaces two or three times with brushes or tampons made of rags and tow while the solvent is sprinkled onto the surface by a decontamination machine, the most common of which is a vehicle with a capacity of 2,000 liters. Firearms can be cleaned by washing the different parts three or four times with solvent and then drying and greasing them well before reassembling.

In the decontamination points behind the lines troops can usually treat their own weapons before handing their uniforms to be cleansed. They are then treated themselves, given fresh clothing and returned to their units.

Combat conditions would not usually permit artillery to be removed from its firing position. Nevertheless, it is probable that there would be long pauses in the firing which would permit complete decontamination on the site. Thus a space would have to be prepared for a machine to be brought up to cleanse the weapons. Afterwards, the working area would be covered with a layer of non-contaminated earth and marked "infected," and the men engaged in the operation also decontaminated.

Decontamination of separate areas is very exceptional. In such cases the top 3-5 centimeters of earth are removed in summer and in winter the top layer of snow to a depth of 20 centimeters if powdery and about 10 centimeters if packed.

Decontamination of Personnel

This process, too, can be either complete or partial. In the latter case the exposed parts of the body are wiped with tampons moistened with a disinfectant. As a last resort, these parts of the body can be wiped with handkerchiefs, towels or anything else at hand soaked in water, or even dry. Complete decontamination is carried out after the fighting and only at the commander's discretion. The whole body is washed with hot water and soap. A final dosimetric check is essential.

No information is given in Soviet sources that a special section of the General Staff exists to deal with the use of and defense against atomic weapons. However, there are many indications that the defense aspect, at least, is being dealt with by the Chief Administration of Chemical Defense and its staff. It is perhaps not without significance that qualified members of the chemical section were retained after the war and have increased considerably in number. The only difference is that the name has been changed slightly.

In the Soviet Army the means of chemical and atomic defense are the same. Troops are probably provided with protective oils against radiation. It is also possible that other, as yet secret, methods have been devised, for the Soviets always use the vague term "decontaminating agents."

So far, atomic defense has been given no definite official form, although secret instructions exist on the subject. There seems little doubt that the prospect of large losses due to radiation is not unduly worrying the Soviet high command. However, ordinary military training is being supplemented by atomic defense training, even though of a comparatively imperfect form.

One important final point is that atomic defense as a whole comes under the jurisdiction not of the Army but of the MVD.

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CURRENT SOVIET AFFAIRS

Foreign Policy

Return to the Motherland

Toward the end of March 1955 a Soviet-sponsored "Committee for Return to the Motherland" was organized in East Berlin as a new Communist effort to disorganize the emigration from the USSR. Through its irregularly-appearing newspaper *Za vozvrashchenie na Rodinu* (For Return to the Motherland) being sent to émigrés in the West, the Committee is attempting to induce former Soviet citizens to abandon the free world and return to the USSR.

During the first years after World War II, when Soviet missions were able to travel and operate freely in Western Europe, many former Soviet citizens were induced or compelled to return on the basis of the Yalta agreements. When, later, Soviet activities in the West were drastically curtailed, the Soviets were forced to resort to other means in their program for dealing with the emigration. The formation of the Committee is one element of this program.

At this writing five issues of *For Return to the Motherland* have appeared, the first in April 1955. The initial issue was a weak, poorly-organized attempt at propaganda, and was mainly in the nature of a declaration. The Committee's address took up the whole of the first page. This verbose address was in essence an appeal to the motherland's "prodigal sons" to return. Great stress was laid on the statement, couched in lyrical terms, that there was no need to harbor any fears and that the motherland was waiting with open arms to receive even those who had sinned against her. She was calling upon all who had been "thrown by the cruel storm of war beyond the borders of the motherland"[1] to return. No mention was made of the atrocities at Dachau and Plattling, and according to the address the only reason that the refugees did not return was, apparently, that they were being either terrorized or deceived: "Fear holds you back . . . fanned by the false propaganda of overseas masters and their base myrmidons who assert day and night that you will be met in the Soviet Union as renegades, oppressed and sent to forced labor. Do not believe them! They lie!"[2]

The remaining sections in this first issue simply expand and illustrate the address. Included were brief descriptions of the members of the Committee, who were depicted as very manly and reliable individuals.

The composition of the Committee is revealing inasmuch as its members all belong to the intelligentsia. There is a general, a writer, a producer, scholars, engineers and farming experts, but not a single peasant or kolkhoznik. It would seem, therefore, that the new move is directed at the intelligentsia. However, the content of the newspaper seems more designed for popular appeal. This contradiction may have sprung from the rapidity with which the Committee was

[1] *Za vozvrashchenie na Rodinu* (For Return to the Motherland), Berlin, No. 1, April, 1955.
[2] *Ibid.*

founded. The newspaper's physical appearance, which in no way differs from the mass-produced newssheets issued for factories, mines and the like, would tend to support this view. Certain aspects of the printing indicate that the newspaper is produced on one of the mobile field presses with which the staffs of Soviet divisions and armies are provided.

The second issue differed from the first only in the fact that there was no new appeal. It consisted mainly of "revelations" (also a feature of the first issue) of the "redefector" Vasilaky. Evidently, despite the lack of adequate material, the new "weapon" in the cold war is to be employed as frequently as possible.

The *raison d'être* of the Committee and its newspaper was not that the Soviet Union was interested in the fate of the émigrés as such, nor because that country was in need of more specialists and an increased labor force, but because the emigration is a living reproach to the Soviet system. The more recent emigration, consisting of those who have left the USSR since 1941, is historically unprecedented since it does not form a coherent class or national group. It includes representatives of all classes, academicians and simple farm workers, monarchists and people who have been Communist Party members for many years, and it is multinational. It is living proof that the Soviet regime is equally unacceptable to all classes and nations within the Soviet Union.

The existence of this emigration is a more effective weapon in the cold war than the perpetual Soviet assertions that the Communist system is superior to all others. Consequently, the strength of the emigration had to be undermined. To this end, some people, at least, had to be enticed back so that it could be argued that not all the émigrés were anti-Soviet. It is also possible that the post-Stalin leaders wished to strengthen their position by appearing merciful as well as "peace-loving."

The third number appeared in May and was somewhat more purposeful than the preceding issues. The leading article is entitled "Our Powerful Soviet Homeland" and describes with pathos the grandeur and might of the Soviet Union, the victory that has been achieved and then, not particularly pertinently, makes an appeal for an end to be put to mistrust and doubt: "Our fellow countrymen living abroad recall the harsh days of the ordeals of war which our country has overcome, and with the name of the motherland on their lips, they will break with fear and disbelief."[3]

To give force to this article details of victory celebrations in a number of the Soviet republic capitals are given, together with a poem by M. Matusovsky entitled "A Word from My Friend at the Front." This poem, in common with most of the literary sections in the newspaper, is a reprint. The only original composition is the story of a displaced person, "Anton Beda," in the form of a poem printed serially in each issue.

A large section in the third number is occupied by an article entitled "The Heads of NTS in the Service of American Intelligence." This is an attempt to create the impression that the politicians among the emigration are acquisitive

[3] *Ibid.*, No. 3, May, 1955.

speculators and hirelings. To show its solicitude for the people "in an alien country" the newspaper devotes a further page to a description of the lives of displaced persons. The editors can hardly be accused of understatement. For example, one émigré, whose only identifications is given as 'I.O.' "works in a factory; he cuts, bends and carries sheets of boiler metal, electrically welds the boilers, covers and polishes them."[4] The editors evidently wish to emphasize how hard this person's work is, with the added implication that life is not so difficult in the Soviet Union. However, the real point was that the worker received only 65 DMs ($15) a week. The fact is overlooked that many German families live fairly well on the same wage. *Return to the Motherland* asserts nevertheless that 'I.O' is unable to buy medicine for his sick wife (which he could get free of charge under the obligatory health insurance scheme for workers) and that he had not enough money to buy her even a small luxury. Similar "instances" of émigré life are cited.

The fourth issue of the newspaper, dated June 1955, showed that the issuing committee had intensified its activities and had marshaled all the propaganda means at its disposal to entice any waverer back to the Soviet Union. Although this number differs but little from the earlier issues, the line being pursued is thrown into relief rather more clearly. There are five main features:

1. Play on patriotic feelings
2. Stressing of the fact that there is now nothing to fear on account of past "sins"
3. Discrediting of the prominent members of the emigration
4. Play on natural feelings towards relatives in the Soviet Union, always an acute problem for the émigré
5. Exaggeration of certain negative features of life in a foreign country.

The leitmotif in this number is a passage taken from the address: "Some have left their motherland, nursing in their hearts a sense of injury for some injustice, ... not realizing that injustices pass but love for one's native land remains eternal."[5]

This approach has a certain effect, being almost an admission of the right to feel injured by injustice on the part of the authorities. However, this theme is not developed further although hints appear elsewhere.

The leading article, "The Thaw Has Set in," aims to show that a large section of the emigration has responded to the Committee's appeals. The indecision of certain "individuals" is explained as due to the fear instilled in them by the émigré leaders:

> How they rage. They convene meetings and use everything short of cudgels to drive the displaced persons there (for example, the recent meeting in a Munich tavern), fabricate clumsy falsifications or simply disgorge streams

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.*, No. 4, June, 1955.

of abuse against those who sound the call to return to the motherland and against those who would respond to the call.[6]

In addition to the Munich meeting, the writer cites as an example the publication of the Ukrainian *Zbirnyk*. Both are represented as attempts to intimidate the emigration. The editorial again insists that the émigrés have nothing to fear and cleverly avoids mentioning known cases of repressive action against voluntary repatriates.

One noteworthy feature is that in the first four numbers no mention at all has been made of the present Soviet leaders or of Stalin. Even the report on the Yugoslav-Soviet agreement avoided any mention of names. This is probably because the horrors connected with repatriation are linked with Stalin and those of his associates who have succeeded him.

The article, "Great Victories of the Camp of Peace," deals with such events as the Warsaw Conference, the signing of the Austrian Peace Treaty and the Peace Congress in Helsinki. The commentaries would indicate that the aim of the article is to demonstrate that the Soviet Union is growing in strength while the capitalist countries are weakening. The implication is quite clear: the émigrés should go over to the stronger side.

In the fifth issue of the newspaper, which came out in June, great emphasis was laid on the extent to which people have responded. Thus, the article "Bon Voyage" begins as follows:

> At the Berlin station, from which trains leave for the Soviet Union, one can witness scenes of departure more and more frequently . . . happy departure scenes . . . On the faces of these people happy excitement is plainly visible. They are going to the Soviet Union after a long absence . . .[7]

In the same, unnaturally high-flown tone the article relates how these people have discarded their fears and misgivings and now believe in a happy future. The letters printed in this issue from people who have returned are interesting. There are seven in all, including letters from a Latvian, a Lithuanian, two who were taken to Germany as children and the wife of a Hollander. It is perhaps significant that none of these are likely to have known Soviet life really intimately.

Although the newspaper had stressed that the motherland would forgive all, the leaders of émigré organizations are told: "But naturally, you rats cannot expect any mercy, you have caused too much damage."[8]

As in the earlier numbers, the last page is devoted to statements allegedly reflecting the life of the émigrés. However, accurate details are conspicuous by their absence. People are referred to as "an agronomist I—ch," or "the architect B—ko." Who they really are and where they live remains a mystery.

The editors have started to improve the external appearance of the newspaper. Clichéd headings to the columns are now appearing. Whether they are relying on this to assist their cause is a moot point. *A. Gaev*

[6] *Ibid.*
[7] *Ibid.*, No. 5, June 1955
[8] *Ibid.*

Domestic Policy

Portfolios without Ministers

At the session of the supreme soviets of the union republics of the USSR, held in March-April 1955, the new composition of the republic government was established. In all the member states of the Soviet Union the sovereign rights endowed under the Union Constitution are not being exercised. In particular, the union republics are not making use of the powers granted under a law promulgated on February 1, 1944 concerning international relations and defense. Although Article 78 of the Soviet Constitution and corresponding articles in the constitutions of the union republics provide for ministries of foreign affairs and defense, three republics—the RSFSR, the Moldavian SSR and the Kazakh SSR—do not have foreign ministries, while none of the republics have defense ministries.

Certain points which illustrate the development of relations between the USSR and its constituent republics in foreign affairs and the organization of armed forces help an understanding of the present position.

The formation of the Soviet Union in December 1922 was preceded by a period during which state interrelations within the Soviet territorial and political complex were based on contractual agreements. The single, strictly centralized force dominating the Soviet state system was the Bolshevik Party, which avoided emphasizing the moment when the former Russian districts became politically subordinated to a single, Soviet state center. In carrying out its policy of consistent centralization the Central Committee of the Russian Bolshevik Communist Party in 1919—1922 usually avoided the sphere of foreign relations thereby accentuating the declared independence of the Soviet state components.

The first stage of the unification of the RSFSR and the republics was characterized by the so-called military union, which envisaged a close union of military organization and certain economic administrative branches. Questions of foreign policy were not brought up.

The second stage was reached in 1920—1921 when special agreements on a military and economic union between the RSFSR and the other soviet republics were signed. The position was left unchanged as regards the international legal rights of the union's members. This did not mean that the republics had been granted autonomy in the sphere of foreign policy. The decisive role in all the Soviet regime's foreign political dealings was played by the government of the RSFSR. In certain cases this was achieved by the other republics entrusting the government of the RSFSR with the defense of their foreign interests. Such was the case during the preparations for the proposed conference on Princes' Islands in the Sea of Marmora at the beginning of 1919 and at the Genoa Conference in May 1932. The practice of "joint" speeches was another method. The note handed to Romania by the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR in November, 1920 on the subject of Bessarabia and the joint participation of these two republics in the Riga peace talks with Poland are examples.

There were cases when the other republics legalized in the form of a supplement any international legal position directly concerning them which had already been established as an agreement between the RSFSR and the state concerned. Thus, the Kars Treaty with Turkey, signed by the Transcaucasian Soviet republics on October 13, 1921, was merely a repetition of the treaty between Turkey and the RSFSR signed on March 16, 1921. The position was analagous with regard to the pact between the Ukrainian SSR and Turkey, drawn up on January 21, 1921.

Up to the end of 1922 Soviet international legal rights and obligations were still formulated by acts in which, in the majority of cases, the soviet republics act as separate units. One source states that "in the period 1920—1922 the union republics, excluding the RSFSR, drew up 70 international agreements."[1]

The question of concentrating Soviet foreign policy and depriving the members of the Soviet state of the right to act in this sphere became most pronounced when the USSR was formed. The political basis for these measures was given by Stalin at the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets on December 26, 1922. It came from the admission that a united front had to be established in diplomatic affairs.[2] Elements of legal reasoning in these demands are evident in Stalin's announcement at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party in June 1923 on the subject of the Soviet Constitution. He stated that there could be no question of founding a unified state if each republic retained its own commissariat of foreign affairs and commissariat of foreign trade.[3] Stalin declared that the originators of the "Ukrainian Project," who insisted that these commissariats be preserved in the governments of the individual republics, wished to achieve in the definition of the union "something between a confederation and a federation with an inclination toward confederation."[4] He believed that the existence of a commissariat of foreign affairs in the republic government would have created a situation in which "the emergence before the outside world of the whole union as a single state is obviously disappearing . . . and we . . . are creating not a united state but a conglomeration of republics."[5] Thus, the Communist leaders' aims of attaining a unification of the state by political mastery over the territorial and national components within the framework of a united state would have excluded the possibility of union republics exercising their rights in international relations. This was in theory based on the incompatibility of such rights with the nature of a federal state.

The second, "Stalin" Constitution, formulated in 1936, was adopted under the conditions of a continued stressing of the USSR's leading role, strengthening of the principle of a single leadership and a united planning and the spreading

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[1] D. L. Zlatopolsky, *Obrazovanie i razvitie SSSR kak soyuznogo gosudarstva* (The Formation and Development of the USSR as a Union State), Moscow, 1954, p. 202.

[2] *Obrazovanie SSSR* (Formation of the USSR), Moscow, 1949, p. 321.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 386.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] Stalin, *Sochineniya* (Works), vol. V, Moscow, 1952, p. 336.

of these principles to other spheres of social life.[6] It could not entail any changes such as granting the individual republics competence in the sphere of foreign policy.

The law promulgated on February 1, 1944 granting the union republics competence in international relations was therefore unexpected, especially as the source already quoted, when evaluating the political situation in the USSR during World War II, asserted that the war resulted in the "welding of numerous nationalities into a unified state."[7] It can safely be assumed that the 1944 law was not the result of the organic development of the Soviet state but was evoked by other considerations.

Soviet sources do not give a clear-cut and exhaustive political and constitutional foundation for the 1944 law. They confine themselves mainly to generalizations, devoid of any indication of the actual reasons for this act or of the ways it could be realized. Molotov, when announcing the draft of the law to the Supreme Soviet, stated that "it has become vital that a general, positive method of development in the Soviet Union's international relations should embrace completely not only all-union requirements but also the varied and increasing demands of the union republics in foreign affairs."[8]

However, he did not develop his proposals and passed over in silence the methods by which the union republics could satisfy these demands. Moreover, he did not answer the question of why the problem of a diversity in the interests of the members of the Soviet Union arose only after 29 years, in a complex and desperate war atmosphere. Statements made during the discussion on the law answer this question to a certain extent. Bogomolets, the president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR said, "a specifically national aim of the Ukraine is the need to establish a close, direct contact between a Slavic state—the Ukraine—and two of her Slavic neighbors—Poland and Czechoslovakia."

He also remarked that "the creation of a democratic Poland and a democratic Czechoslovakia as a result of the victorious conclusion of the war has created the conditions necessary for the friendly cooperation of the three Slavic states—the Ukraine, Poland and Czechoslovakia."[9]

V. Lacis, President of the Latvian SSR, considered the requirements of the Latvian people to be "the taking of measures to counter the anti-national counter-revolutionary activities carried on in the United States of America by representatives of the fascist government of Latvia that had been overthrown by the Latvian people."

To J. Paleckis one of the peculiarities of the Lithuanian SSR was the fact that about three million Lithuanians lived abroad, a fact that "had to be taken into consideration."[10]

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[6] *Sovetskoe gosudarstvennoe pravo* (Soviet State Law), Moscow, 1948, p. 233.
[7] *Ibid.*
[8] D. L. Zlatopolsky, *op. cit.*, p. 202.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 203.
[10] *Ibid.*

Thus it can be seen that "the union republics' growing demands in the sphere of foreign affairs" were not directed at developing concrete international ties but at fulfilling certain "all-union" tasks, chiefly of a purely demonstrative, propagandistic nature. Molotov indicated this aspect of the 1944 measures when he stated that "the proposed reorganization of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the People's Commissariat of Defense is a new step forward toward the solution of the national question."[11]

These tactics of accentuating the "Lenin national principle of a soviet socialist federation"[12] at a time when the Soviets were fighting to recapture the territory taken by the Germans and their armies were preparing to enter the former satellite countries had a particular significance. The 1944 state reorganizations were to have facilitated the conclusion of the war and countered the German policy of abolishing national sovereignty and national culture of the former Soviet areas and the present Soviet satellites.

The question of granting individual Soviet republics the right to participate in foreign affairs had another practical aspect, by which the Kremlin hoped to increase its representation on the international scene. At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in August-September 1944 the Soviets succeeded in obtaining 16 votes in a future international organization. After opposition from the leading Western powers, the Soviets' claims at Yalta were restricted to three republics, the Ukraine, Belorussia and Latvia. In order not to lose face and to give a political basis for renouncing the demand for 16 seats in the United Nations, Molotov agreed at Yalta to take into consideration the experience of the British dominions, which had achieved their independence "by a slow progress, step by step."[13] Two additional seats were won by the USSR for the Ukrainian and Belorussian SSR's, which had deserved the right to "enter the new world organization as founder members,"[14] since they were the Germans' first victims and therefore suffered particularly heavy losses. There is little doubt that political arguments were specially sought and adapted to ensure the Yalta compromise.

The practice of the next decade has shown that the proclaimed "growth of independence and individual initiative" of the Soviet republics in foreign affairs did not have any great success. At present, three of them, the RSFSR and the Moldavian and Kazakh SSR's have officially renounced these rights. The motive, particularly of the latter two, can only be surmised.

The reason for the existence of foreign ministries in the government of the union republics is apparent only in the case of the Ukrainian and Belorussian SSR's, which are of importance to the USSR at the UN. As for the other 11 republics, they have a definite role in Soviet foreign policy. The four Moslem republics, Azerbaidzhan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenia and Tadzhikistan, border on Iran and Afghanistan, territories with a nationally kindred population. Since

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 203.
[12] *Ibid.*
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

the war particular "national demands" of Soviet Armenia and Georgia have involved territorial claims against Turkish Kars and Ardagan based on past history. Thus, these republics can be used by the Kremlin on the international scene as a means of realizing future expansionist ambitions. To a certain extent the same can be said of the Karelo-Finnish SSR in its relations toward Finland. Raisons d'être for foreign ministries in the Baltic republics are also implicit in the statements made by Lacis and Paleckis. The case of Kazakhstan and Kirgizia, whose political and geographical conditions approach those of the other Central Asian republics, is more complex. The question of foreign ministries for them has been solved differently.

The realization of the 1944 law with respect to the union republics' war ministries is more original. The question of creating a unified system of armed forces had been solved before the formation of the USSR. The foundation for this process had been laid by a directive "On Military Unity" from the Central Committee in May 1919 and finally incorporated in the agreements of the RSFSR with the other republics in 1920—1921. However, the organization of a unified Soviet military department and army did not at the time remove from the agenda the question of national (in composition and the language of command) sections. A resolution passed at the Fourth Congress of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party on April 23, 1923 envisaged the need to begin training officers for "the national military units."[15] However, the creation of officer cadres aimed not so much at a reorganization of the Soviet armed forces on a national basis but at setting up a kind of model. This resolution gave the reasons for the organization of national formations, which were to be limited in number, in general terms. It proposed that in connection with the creation of national units the size of the army be increased by approximately 20,000 to 25,000 men.[16] That was equivalent to about 3—4% at the time. National formations did not develop on any scale and in 1937 ceased to exist.

During the war the question of raising national armed units was again raised. In 1941 the Latvian Infantry Division was formed. Other national formations were also created, from Lithuania, Estonia, Azerbaidzhan, Georgia and Armenia.[17] Soviet sources, when listing the national formations, never mention the existence of Ukrainian or Belorussian units. The official reason for reviving defense ministries in the union republics, based on the statement that national military cadres were created during the war,[18] in view of its obvious insincerity does not warrant serious attention. In any case, it contradicts the subsequent practice of refusing to found war departments in the union republics, since it would then be necessary to admit that the national cadres formed during the war had "disappeared."

It is difficult to assess the actual measures which were responsible for the 1944 law. It might have been an attempt to appeal to the national spirit as a

[15] *Obrazovanie SSSR, op. cit.*, pp. 124—125.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 392.

[17] *Sovetskoe gosudarstvennoe pravo, op. cit.*, p. 239.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 203.

supplement to the wartime slogan of Soviet and Russian patriotism, the result of certain demonstrative actions on the part of the "liberated" countries of Eastern and Central Europe or a possible counter to the policy of "national units" in the German army. Whatever the truth, all that remains of the tactics of creating defense ministries in the union and republics are references in the relevant articles of the union and republic constitutions.

The question of why the points established by the 1944 law but to all intents and purposes inoperative have been left on the books is a comparative mystery. It is perhaps significant, however, that no Soviet publication dealing with Soviet federal law ignores the 1944 law. For example, one source particularly emphasises that the "constitutional changes of 1944 were not a simple alteration of the organizational structure of the two branches of the administration . . . but important amendments in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the need for which was brought about on the one hand by the national development of the republics and on the other by the development and strengthening of the Union of the SSR as a federation . . ."[19]

It must be assumed that the Soviet government found it impossible to rescind the points in the 1944 law chiefly because of the impression this may have created both at home and abroad. Moreover, the motives behind the revision by the Central Committee of these acts could, with certain variations, again become actual. In that case the relevant lines of Article 78 of the Soviet Constitution could remain purely declarative as, for example, Article 17 on the right of the union republics to secede from the Union, an eventuality which the Soviets themselves consider virtually impossible.[20] *O. Jurczenko*

[19] *Sovetskoe gosudarstvennoe pravo, op. cit.*, p. 239.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 254.

Party Political Training in the Soviet Union

On June 1, 1955 the academic year for Party political "education" ended in the Soviet Union. The new term is scheduled to begin on October 1. However, the plenum of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party has decided to hold monthly seminars throughout the USSR during the summer period for all directors of political education and propagandists teaching Marxist-Leninist theories.[1] Many comments in the Soviet press show clearly that the state of political training in the Soviet Union is far from satisfactory. Compulsory Communist education has long been a tedious obligation for its students. During the Malenkov era many Communists no longer attended political lectures, or if they did so attendance was merely a formality.

The Soviet leaders in their attempts to improve matters and gain sympathy from wide circles of Communists, introduced the "voluntary" principle in political training, a move which was more or less a recognition of the existing situation.

[1] *Partiinaya zhizn*, Moscow, 1955, No. 10.

By the end of 1954 the Party leaders were already trying to regain their losses in the sphere of political education. Press reports at that time stated that many Communist leaders had failed to understand the importance of the voluntary principle, had kept aloof from supervising the studies of Communists and "neglected the cause of Party education."

The concept "voluntary" has a specific connotation as the Soviets have pointed out:

> Certain Party leaders think that voluntary studies by Communists within the framework of Party education exempt them from the duties of organizing propaganda. Such leaders forget that Communist Party regulations oblige every Communist to "work at heightening his consciousness and mastering the principles of Marxism-Leninism." Voluntariness in Party education in no way means that a Communist may or may not work at heightening his consciousness according to inclination. It is a question of the Communist himself deciding in which way he will fulfill his obligations.[2]

Nevertheless the situation since last October has not improved, nor is there any sign of an amelioration for the academic year 1955-56. This conclusion is supported by an interesting editorial in *Partiinaya zhizn* entitled "To Develop Lively Interest in Marxist-Leninist Theory." Most Communists, it seems, in accordance with the voluntary principle, prefer the method of political self-education.[3] This method is doubtlessly very popular as it enables many Communists to escape the burdensome, boring and time-consuming political groups which are normally obligatory. Moreover, by working individually and without supervision, more and more Communists are neglecting the arid Marxist-Leninist theories and are studying really interesting subjects in an attempt to broaden their educational horizons.[4]

Judging from the above-mentioned editorial, resistance to participation in political training has become so serious that local Party leaders are now unwilling to take any decisive steps:

> Certain Party propaganda leaders are even afraid to utter the word "control" and do not know if they should criticize these "independent idlers" at Party meetings or if they should enquire of a Communist whether or not he is increasing his knowledge in the sphere of Marxism-Leninism.[5]

To surmount these difficulties the Soviet government has decided upon stricter supervision of political training. *Partiinaya zhizn* writes: "It is not a matter of whether or not a Communist studies, but what and how he studies. This is only possible if the Party organization takes a daily interest in the Communist's ideological life, a situation which is inevitably linked with some specific form of control."[6]

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[2] *Partiinaya zhizn*, Moscow, 1954, No. 10.
[3] *Ibid.*, 1955, No. 6.
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] *Ibid.*, 1955, No. 9.

This control will be exercised during the academic year 1955—1956 by means of theoretical, instructional seminars, regular individual and group "consultations" and theoretical discussions at which Communists will be tested. Communists will be obliged to attend a whole series of lectures. Those who cannot study independently will be taught in classes.

When discussing the system of Party political education mention must be made of the Higher Party School of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. From the correspondence course section of this school are trained those theoreticians responsible for Marxist-Leninist theoretical training throughout the Soviet Union. *Partiinaya zhizn* recently gave some interesting information on this correspondence work. At present about 12,000 persons are taking such courses, and during the past eight years more than 4,500 Party workers completed their studies with the school. It is pointed out, however, that many are not even taking their tests. The Higher Party School is not carrying out adequate supervision of the students and their work. Republic and oblast authorities are also unsatisfactory in this respect, and the standard of lectures and advice to students is locally very mediocre.[7]

The Soviet press is constantly stressing the need for more political training and propaganda which should resolve existing difficulties, inspire belief in the superiority of the Soviet order and mobilize the nation's strength so as to implement succesfully future Party and government tasks. However, if Communists shirk their studies and find political education distasteful, then the general attitude of many millions of the non-Party Soviet population to Party propaganda certainly needs no elucidating.

In this respect, G. Glezerman's article "How to Understand that Being Determines Consciousness" in a recent issue of *Partiinaya zhizn* is worth noting. He writes:

> In order to root the survivals of capitalism out of the minds of the people, an active offensive struggle is needed against each and every survival, for these will not disappear by themselves. The most important element in this struggle is the all-round educational and propagandistic work of Party and public organizations. Wherever the latter is poor, there is a chance that the survivals of capitalism will be revived.[8]

In addition to difficulties in organizing Party training, the Soviet leaders are encountering tremendous problems as regards the subjects of this training. Last year most attention was paid to economic studies since it was felt that if Communists improved their knowledge in this sphere, there would be a concomitantly positive effect within the Soviet economy.[9] However, the situation is not very promising with respect to the teaching of important aspects of Party training such as Party history or historical and dialectic materialism. This is because since Stalin's death a considerable reappraisal of values has occurred

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[7] *Partiinaya zhizn*, Moscow, 1955, No. 9.

[8] *Ibid.*, 1955, No. 11.

[9] *Ibid.*, 1954, No. 10.

among theoreticians. They are showing much more independence in their work and are tending more and more to revise or reexamine various theses of the Marx-Lenin-Stalin doctrine.

An interesting recent example of this reappraisal of values appeared in *Literaturnaya gazeta* a few months ago. The tremendous influence that Stalin supposedly wielded over military operations during World War II was the subject of every Soviet journal and newspaper. The initial defeats suffered by the Soviets in 1941 were interpreted as a particularly skillful move by Soviet military strategists. This attitude has changed radically. The above-mentioned article considers it intolerable that Soviet military literature depict the retreat of Soviet forces during the initial phase of World War II as "a period of so-called . . . active defense. Moreover, authors contradict the hard facts by making it appear as if this active defense had been planned earlier and taken into account by our commanders."[10] The article also protests against distortions of "historical truth," pointing out that such fallacious interpretations can only produce a repetition of similar claims in the future.[11]

Lately certain theoretical and ideological journals have published illuminating material on current discussions among Soviet theoreticians. A recent issue of *Voprosy filosofii* contains the results of a number of meetings held this year in the Philosophical Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the Higher Party School of the Lenin Military-Political Academy and the Moscow Oblast Party School. The two fundamental issues dealt with at these meetings concerned the struggle against dogmatic interpretations of theoretical problems and attempts to revise a number of theoretical propositions.[12]

The same issue of *Voprosy filosofii* publishes the polemic on the new programs of courses in historical and dialectical materialism. The conclusion reached is that these programs should be formulated "with the participation of all who are concerned with philosophy."[13]

It is interesting to note that the book *Istorichesky materializm* (Historical Materialism) published in Moscow in 1954 was severely criticized at many of the meetings mentioned in *Voprosy filosofii*. It is expected that the book's content will be modified considerably as a result. Incidentally, other items discussed at these meetings included the defining of historical materialism, contradictions between productive forces and production relations, and whether being determines consciousness or if social awareness is lagging behind social being. Soviet theoreticians are, of course, unwilling to attribute shortcomings in the Communist system to capitalist influence and prefer to explain them as engendered by imperfect production relations during the first stage of a socialist society. *Partiinaya zhizn* writes, "an increase in the material well-being of the masses under a socialist order is generally conducive to the development of

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[10] *Literaturnaya gazeta*, Moscow, May 28, 1955.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] *Voprosy filosofii*, Moscow, 1955, No. 2.

[13] *Ibid.*

socialist elements in their consciousness, whereas provisional economic hardships may encourage capitalist survivals among the population."[14]

Voprosy filosofii also mentions discussion of production relations and the development of productive forces. A whole issue revolves around discrepancies between Soviet theory and practice. Theory maintains that production relations in socialist and not capitalist countries further the development of productive forces whereas the opposite is the case in reality.[15]

Party and government authorities have so far been unsuccessful in preventing these discussions. A step in this direction was doubtless the appointment of *Pravda's* editor, Shepilov, to the secretariat of the Communist Party's Central Committee.[16] Shepilov is generally acknowledged as a theoretician of repute and a brilliant organizer. In any case, the Soviet leaders appreciate that a totalitarian system can only be maintained successfully if it is based on an immutable, incontestable theory, as was the case under Stalin. *Yu. Marin*

[14] *Partiinaya zhizn*, Moscow, 1955, No. 11.
[15] *Voprosy filosofii*, Moscow, 1955, No. 2.
[16] *Pravda*, July 13, 1955.

The Economy

Gas

As the end of the Fifth Five-Year Plan approaches, it is clear that the Soviet gas industry, which controls the exploitation of natural gas as well as the production of artificial gas, has not achieved satisfactory results. This important branch of Soviet energy production has for several years now been unable to overcome its continual failure to meet its planned goals. Consequently the official press of the Ministry of the Oil Industry has been devoting special attention to the gas industry.

At the beginning of 1955 former Minister of the Oil Industry Baibakov made certain self-critical remarks which were printed in *Neftyanoe khozyaistvo*.[1] Recently the same journal published an editorial entitled "For a More Rapid Development of the Gas Industry," which pointed out the considerable shortcomings in this branch of Soviet industry and outlined the necessary improvements.[2] The press, and *Pravda* especially, have printed several articles and reports on the gas industry.[3]

In Baibakov's article the following principal shortcomings were singled out:

1. Totally inadequate exploitation of existing gas resources for industry, the production of synthetic fuel, mineral fertilizers and for the everyday needs of the Soviet population.

[1] *Neftyanoe khozyaistvo*, Moscow, 1955, No. 1, pp. 6—7.
[2] *Ibid.*, 1955, No. 4, pp. 1—4.
[3] *Pravda*, January 25, 1955; May 14, 1955; May 21, 1955; June 14, 1955.

2. The exceptionally low rate of development of the gas industry.

3. The unsatisfactory state of work being carried out to capture and utilize natural gas.

4. Great losses to the atmosphere of the gases which accompany oil extraction.

Such losses occur in the majority of oil-bearing regions, particularly in Bashkiria, the Tatar regions, Kuibyshev Oblast and Krasnodar Krai.

There is good reason for Soviet apprehension concerning the gas industry. Gas has not yet become the important source of energy in the Soviet economy it has in the Western world. The relative importance of gas as a fuel is low. In 1950 the amounts of fuel planned from different sources were as follows:[4]

Coal	75.6%	Peat	6.2%
Firewood	9.7%	Shale	0.8%
Petroleum	6.3%	Natural Gas	1.4%

The corresponding share of natural gas in United States fuel sources in 1948 was 15%.[5] The Soviet Union is, therefore, well behind the United States in the extraction, production and consumption of gas. Moreover, natural gas has a large share in total US gas production (65%), and gas from coke factories and oil refineries also plays a significant part (20%) in US output, whereas gas produced at special gas works accounted for only 15%.[6]

The following table illustrates the growth of Soviet gas production:

Natural Gas Production in the USSR

(Million Cubic Meters)

	Production	Increase over Previous Year
1913	48	—
1930	840	—
1940	4,960	—
1945	5,380	—
1946	5,650	270
1947	6,920	1,270
1948	7,620	700
1949	7,850	230
1950 (Plan)	8,400	550
1951	9,070	670
1952	9,250	180
1953	9,250	No Increase
1954	10,080	830
1955 (Plan)	15,120	5,040

SOURCES: *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (The Large Soviet Encyclopedia), 2nd ed., X, 40. The Law on the Five-Year Plan for the Rehabilitation and Development of the National Economy from 1946 to 1950, Moscow, 1946, p. 362; Reports of the Central Statistical Administration on the Results of the Plans for the National Economy in 1947—1954; Directives of the Nineteenth Party Congress. Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Sessions of the Central Committee, Part II, 7th ed., 1925—1953.

NOTE ON TABLE. Soviet sources have always given percentage increases over the previous year with no absolute figures, except in 1950, when the planned production was to be 8,400 million cubic meters. No information was given on the fulfillment of this plan. It has been assumed, for the purposes of the table, that the planned production was fulfilled 100%. The remaining absolute figures have been worked out accordingly.

[4] B. A. Rozentreter, *Kamenny ugol, ego dobycha i znachenie v narodnom khozyaistve* (Coal, Its Extraction and Significance in the National Economy), Moscow, 1949.

[5] *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (The Large Soviet Encyclopedia) [BSE], 2nd ed., X, 41.

[6] *Ibid.*

During World War II, therefore, gas production actually increased. During the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1946—1950) production again increased considerably, largely as a result of the construction of two new gas mains from Dashava to Kiev and Saratov to Moscow, which provided a means of exploiting the high-output sources at Dashava, Elshanka and Kurdyumov (the last two on the Volga). The Fifth Five-Year Plan, on the other hand, showed a very low rate of increase and a systematic failure to fulfill the plan. For example, in 1954 natural gas production was only 20% higher than in 1950, although the directives of the Nineteenth Party Congress on the Fifth Five-Year Plan provided that:

> . . . the further development of the gas industry be ensured. During the Five-Year Plan the extraction of natural gas and incidental gas, together with the production of gas from coal and shales is to be increased by approximately 80%. Gas is to be more fully exploited for household needs and is to be used as automobile fuel and for the production of chemical products.[7]

However, since there has been no increase greater than 830 million cubic tons in the first four years of the Fifth Five-Year Plan, it is virtually impossible to achieve a jump of 5,040 million cubic tons in 1955. The reasons for the failure of the plan for the extraction of natural and incidental gas are of considerable interest, since the USSR has enormous resources of natural fuel gases. For example, a *Pravda* editorial reports:

> Our country possesses enormous and truly incalculable supplies of natural gas. Quite recently very rich deposits of gas were discovered in the Volga and Stavropol regions as well as in the Ukraine and elsewhere in the Soviet Union. In addition to these there are large resources of other industrial gases.[8]

The majority of gases in the USSR are in chemical composition and calorific value suitable for use as fuel and as industrial raw material. The average supply from Soviet gas borings varies from 10,000 to 100,000 cubic meters per day, that is, from 3,650,000 to 36,500,000 cubic meters annually. The maximum output of a well in the Soviet Union is 600,000 cubic meters per day or 219,000,000 cubic meters annually.[9]

The failure to fulfill the plan for production cannot therefore be explained by the insufficiency of deposits. Nor is it a matter of ignoring the importance of gas as an industrial fuel and raw material. A recent article in *Pravda* stated:

> Petroleum and petroleum gas are irreplaceable forms of raw material for the chemical industry, since they make it possible to produce more than 5,000 different types of products such as alcohol, rubber, plastic substances, synthetic fibers, etc. Petroleum is also very important as a strategic raw material . . . The use of natural gases as a source of fuel energy is also very profitable . . . Despite the great resources, the extraction of natural gas in our country is insignificant and is not having the necessary influence on the fuel and energy balance of the country.[10]

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[7] Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Sessions of the Central Committee, Part II, 7th ed., 1925—1953.

[8] *Pravda*, January 25, 1955.

[9] *BSE*, 2nd ed., X, 94.

[10] *Pravda*, May 14, 1955.

Pravda explains that one main cause of the unsatisfactory development of gas extraction has been the fact that the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the State Planning Committee of the USSR have in recent years underestimated the importance of the Soviet gas industry, and that consequently "clearly inadequate capital investment has been allotted to the development of natural gas extraction."[11] This type of statement, which is quite rare in the Soviet Union, indicates that the measures provided for the development of the national economy by the Five-Year Plan are not always properly backed up.

The insufficient funds available for gas prospecting have led to the almost complete cessation of such work or continued operations on a much reduced scale. Prospecting in the Ukraine, where there are very rich deposits, has been reduced to a minimum. A similar slowing-down has taken place in the central regions of the USSR and in Siberia. Consequently many new deposits have not been fully surveyed. Large deposits discovered in the North Caucasus in 1952 are not yet being exploited. A similar situation prevails in the western regions of the Ukraine, where gas deposits were found five years ago. The town of Stalingrad was not linked with the Archeda deposit in Stalingrad Oblast until seven years after the Archeda discovery. The situation is even worse where gas incidental to oil extraction is concerned. The journal *Neftyanoe khozyaistvo* does not attempt to conceal the disorganization which prevails in this field:

> . . . the chief administrations of the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry publish many orders on this question but are in fact organizing the exploitation of this gas in a very inadequate manner. The managers of enterprises are justly punished for the loss of several hundreds of tons of petroleum; but when the same managers lose daily, as they do, thousands and even tens of thousands of tons of gas, the guilty persons are not held responsible. Losses are particularly high in the new petroleum regions, where, despite frequent government decisions on the question, work to utilize gas is not carried out simultaneously with measures to collect and transport petroleum.[12]

Signs of increased interest in the Soviet gas industry have begun to appear only in recent months. The process has been accelerated by decrees of plenary sessions of the Central Committee of the Party dealing with the improvement of agriculture. For example:

> Of great importance to the national economy is the utilization of gas, as provided for in directives of the XIX Party Congress, to obtain valuable chemical products. Nitrogen fertilizers can be obtained from natural gas, and the former are essential for fulfilling the very important tasks set by the Communist Party and the Soviet government for the sharp increase in agricultural production, the development of livestock breeding and exploitation of the virgin and idle lands. The construction of factories for producing nitrogen fertilizers from gas makes it possible to locate the production of fertilizers closer to the agricultural regions where they are used and at the same time reduces capital expenditure for the construction of factories, since it is no longer necessary to have expensive workshops for producing the gas from solid fuel and it does not have to be transported over long distances. The Institute of

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] *Neftyanoe khozyaistvo, Moscow*, 1955, No. 4, p. 2.

Physical Chemistry of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the All-Union Petroleum Gas Research Institute of the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry of the USSR have worked out new methods of processing hydrocarbon gases.[13]

The reason for the changed attitude towards the Soviet gas industry is that it can aid the heavy and defense industries. Improvement of consumer supplies is only of secondary significance and not considered to be of special urgency.

Any increase in the extraction of natural gas has always depended upon the completion of large new gas pipelines which link the gas deposits with the regions where the gas can be consumed. The construction of gas pipelines did not begin until 15 years ago. The first one, 69 kilometers long, linked Dashava in the Carpathian region with Lvov. The considerable shortage of fuel in World War II made it necessary to speed up the construction of a second line from Buguruslan to Kuibyshev. It was completed in 1943 and was 160 kilometers long. After the war the construction of even longer ones was commenced. Between 1945 and 1947 a 37 centimeter pipeline, 843 kilometers in length, was built from Elshanka via Saratov to Moscow. Six compressor stations were installed along the line. The line can carry 1,300,000 cubic meters of gas per day. It cuts through five oblasts: Saratov, Penza, Tambov, Ryazan and Moscow, so that the principal industrial towns in these oblasts will be able to obtain gas from branch lines. Soviet sources state that the gas which comes to Moscow along this line replaces annual deliveries to the capital of 1,000,000 cubic meters of firewood, 650,000 tons of coal and 250,000 tons of petroleum products. The production cost of sufficient Saratov gas to generate one calory is half that for one calory from coal or peat from the Moscow region, one third of that from firewood and one quarter of that from gas produced from coal in the Moscow region.

During the first postwar Five-Year Plan two additional large gas pipelines were constructed: one from Dashava to Kiev (513 kilometers) and one from Kokhtla via Yarve to Leningrad (203 kilometers). The first links the rich deposits in the Carpathian regions with the center of the Ukraine and can supply several large towns on the way through branch lines to be constructed. The second was built in accordance with a government decree of June 1945. The decree provided that Leningrad be supplied with artificial gas from shale, that the amount of firewood used be reduced and that industry be supplied with liquid fuel from shale. Gas was to replace about 3,000,000 cubic meters of firewood and 250,000 tons of liquid fuel annually. There has been a report that gas is now being supplied to Vyborg, and it may therefore be assumed that the Kokhtla—Yarve—Leningrad line has been extended to that city. The Dashava—Kiev line, completed in 1948, was later extended to Moscow, as reported in *Pravda* on May 21, 1955. Moscow is now receiving natural gas both from the Saratov and the Carpathian region. At the same time a large plant producing gas from local coal opened at Shchekino in the Moscow region. The factory is linked by pipeline both with Tula and Moscow. Stalingrad obtains gas from Archeda, also by pipeline.

[13] *Ibid.*

The following table illustrates the development of main gas pipelines in the Soviet Union:

Operating Gas Pipelines in the USSR

	Years of Construction or Opening	Length (km)	Diameter of Pipeline (mm)
Dashava—Lvov	1940—1941	69	300
Buguruslan—Kuibyshev	1943	160	350
Elshanka—Saratov—Moscow	1945—1947	843	320
Dashava—Kiev	1946—1948	513	—
Kokhtla—Yarve—Leningrad	1946—1950	203	—
Kokhtla—Yarve—Tallin	1953	140	—
Kiev—Moscow	1955	787	—
Shchekino—Tula—Moscow	1955	210	—
Archeda—Stalingrad	1955	130	—

SOURCES. The following sources have been used in compiling the table: *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (The Large Soviet Encyclopedia), 2nd ed., X, 40, 41, 76, 77, 78; *Zhilishchno-kommunalnoe khozyaistvo*, Moscow, 1953, No. 1, pp. 21, 22; *Pravda*, January 25, 1955, May 21, 1955, June 14, 1955, June 20, 1955.

In addition to the operating pipelines in the table there are several others under construction at present which will begin operating, in accordance with the latest decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, during the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-1960). Of those being constructed at present, the largest will run from Stavropol to Moscow, from Dashava via Minsk to Leningrad and from Shebelinka via Kharkov and Bryansk to Moscow.[14] One considerable difference between Soviet pipelines and similar installations in the West is that in the Soviet Union these lines are used well below maximum capacity. An editorial in *Pravda* on January 25, 1955, admits that:

> The failure to fulfill the plans for the gasification of several towns is causing great material harm to the state. From ten to fifteen percent only of the total capacity of certain long-range gas pipelines constructed in recent years is being utilized. This means that where natural gas should be burning in the boiler rooms, in municipal enterprises and apartments, solid fuel is still being used.

On June 20, 1955, *Pravda* wrote again:

> Last year, workers in the petroleum industry were compelled to release into the atmosphere up to 12,000,000 cubic meters of incidental gas for lack of consumers. At the same time, however, very little progress is being made in the oblast on work to bring gas to homes, establishments, and industrial enterprises, including Stalingrad itself. Only five percent of the high capacity of the Archeda—Stalingrad pipeline is being utilized, and in summer even less.

Despite the enormous natural gas resources of the Soviet Union the gas borings and the pipelines are almost running idle because of the lack of gas boilers, stoves and water-heating installations for the towns.

Up to the present, only towns in the European part of the USSR have gas, and only Moscow and Leningrad have anything approaching adequate supplies by Western standards. For example, in Moscow on January 1, 1955, 450,000 apartments had gas as against 60,000 in 1940. Soviet sources calculate that 88% of the Moscow population uses gas. Since Moscow's 1955 population was 5,250,000 there

[14] *Pravda*, July 8, 1955.

must have been 4,620,000 persons using gas, and they lived in 450,000 apartments.[15] This figure incidentally shows that an average of 10.2 persons occupies one Moscow apartment.

After the construction of the Kokhtla—Yarve pipeline there was also great progress made in supplying Leningrad with gas. Before the war 30,000 apartments were supplied with gas. In 1950 there were 130,000, on January 1, 1953: 170,000 and in 1955: 230,000. Among the other cities only Kiev, where 75,000 apartments are supplied with gas, Saratov and Lvov may be said to have sufficient gas mains to satisfy the needs of the population.[16] The town of Baku has also been provided with gas although exact information is not available.

Preparatory work or planning for supplying gas is being carried out in the following cities: Kazan, Tula, Rostov-on-Don, Molotov, Ulyanovsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Krivoi Rog, Khmelnitsky, Chernigov, Zhitomir. Work is actually being carried out in Bryansk, Bezhitsa, Vyborg, Grozny, Kaliningrad, Kaluga, Krasnodar, Ordzhonikidze, Ryazan, Stavropol, Ufa, Chernikovsk, Stalino, Makeevka, Zhdanov, Dneprodzerzhinsk, Kolomna. It is planned to supply gas to the following cities in the next few years: Voronezh, Tambov, Armavir, Kislovodsk, Essentuki, Pyatigorsk, Sochi, Shakhty, Ioshkar-Ola, Irkutsk.[17]

Apart from those cities mentioned above which are in the Ukraine, several others in the vicinity of the Dashava gas deposits or near the Dashava—Kiev pipeline also have gas. There are about 45 Ukrainian towns which use gas to some extent.[18]

It is not unusual to find that plans for gas installation have been fulfilled by a small percentage only. During the years since the work in Ordzhonikidze began, "only an insignificant amount of the planned work has been carried out and less than 500 apartments have gas."[19] In 1954 in Bryansk "less than ten percent of the planned work was carried out, gas mains were laid to 235 apartments only and this work cost twice as much as planned."[20]

The gas industry has until recently been a stepchild of Soviet state planning and the national economy. Not until July 1955 did the Council of Ministers of the USSR publish a decree on the development of the gas industry during the period 1956-1960. It is laid down in the decree that during the next Five-Year Plan 132 towns will receive gas supplies and that 250 large industrial enterprises and electric power stations will commence operating on gas instead of fuels which are in short supply. Moreover, it is planned to use gas as a raw material for the chemical industry. Natural gas is to be supplied by line to Leningrad, Kharkov, Minsk, Rostov-on-Don, Riga, Vilna, Voronezh, Kursk, Orel, Taganrog, Zhdanov

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[15] *Ezhenedelny obzor vazhneishykh sobytii v SSSR* (Weekly Survey of the Most Important Events in the USSR), Munich, June 15, 1955, p. 9.

[16] *Zhilishchno-kommunalnoe khozyaistvo*, Moscow, 1953, No. 1; *Neftyanoe khozyaistvo*, Moscow, April 4, 1955; *Pravda*, January 25, 1955; *BSE*, 2nd ed., X, 40—41.

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] *Pravda*, January 25, 1955.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] *Ibid.*

and the health resort towns in the North Caucasus. In all it is planned to bring gas to almost 1,300,000 apartments. To achieve the above aims it is intended to increase the extraction of natural gas by 4.8 times and to double the production of gas from coal and shale.[21]

There have been several decrees on the development of the gas industry, but not one of them has been implemented in practice. It is not therefore clear whether the USSR will succeed in carrying out the present decree or whether it will fail to achieve its aim as previous ones have done. *A. Polezhaev*

Profiteering

Before World War II speculation in consumer goods was very common in the Soviet Union as a result of the acute shortage of many items. In Moscow and the larger capitals of union republics, however, supplies were much better than average and speculation was less noticeable. Numerous provincials traveled to Moscow at that time on various official pretexts (railroad tickets to Moscow were not sold freely before the war) and sometimes from very distant towns, in order to buy up as many of the most varied goods possible and sell them later at many times the price in their home towns. In the large railroad stations the police carried out mass searches, and anyone caught with goods he was about to take out of the capital was severely punished. There were fixed amounts of goods listed at the time—for example, 1 kilogram of sugar, 3 kilograms of flour and 6 meters of cotton fabric—and it was strictly forbidden to take more than the permitted quota out of the capital.

At the present time speculation is even more widespread, occurring in the large towns as well. Some evidence of the extent of speculation may be found in the central daily press, political journals and illustrated magazines, which print accounts of the most varied types of profiteering.

For example, *Partiinaya zhizn,* No. 11, 1955 writes:

> In order to put an end to such a survival of capitalism as speculation, for example, it is essential not only to create an atmosphere of moral condemnation and intolerance towards those who spread this evil, not only to apply to these persons the measures of constraint provided for by law, but also to promote the many-sided development of Soviet trade, the improvement of the population's supplies and the creation of an abundance of objects of consumption. Then only will the ground be cut from under speculation.

There is one aspect to speculation in the Soviet Union which, one would think, could under no circumstances be tolerated. Profiteering takes place in institutions which deal with military supplies. On July 29, 1955 *Krasnaya zvezda* printed an article describing how products from vegetable gardens and hothouses which provide military units with "extras" are sold by the employees on the side at very high prices. On May 20, 1955 the same newspaper wrote that employees in mili-

[21] *Pravda,* July 8, 1955.

tary trading organizations were selling food products, cloth, footwear, etc. at excessive prices on the side, while officers and their families had to do without essential goods. The article also states that goods are sold to the families of servicemen at prices considerably higher than those fixed by the state—"Salesman Korchinsky managed for a long time to 'earn' up to five rubles on every kilogram of meat."

A report on the work of the military trading organization published on July 30, 1955 stated that official conferences are now being held with employees on the subject: "The struggle with speculation and the squandering of socialist property is the most important task in the military trade system."

The important point in reports such as the above is not that speculation is occurring in one or several military shops, vegetable gardens or hog farms (there are quite a few of these farms now in view of the general shortage of supplies), for there must be many places also where the employees are honest and do not indulge in speculation. The essential factors are the following:

1. The level of discipline in the country must have dropped considerably if even the employees of military institutions are beginning to steal and speculate;
2. There is a sufficiently acute shortage of food and consumer goods in the country for it to be worth while to engage in speculation despite the risk of severe punishment if caught;
3. Supplies to the military trading organization must be quite inadequate. This is clear from the fact that, after the sale of a certain quantity of goods on the side, officers and their families cannot obtain any more in the shops. Also typical is the fact that the purchasers had to overpay five rubles per kilogram in order to obtain meat.

It should be added that the military trading organizations were formerly always better supplied, even during times of famine, than civilian shops, including the special closed distribution points for highly-placed persons. It is now clear, however, that even supplies for the Army in the Soviet Union have deteriorated and are by no means adequate. In *Krasnaya zvezda*'s editorial of June 16, 1955 officers in charge of supplies are recommended to use all means at their disposal to create unit vegetable gardens, hothouses, hog fattening points etc., in order to improve servicemen's food and also to organize the collection of wild plants for the same purpose: "Many commanders and managers have shown valuable initiative in organizing in their units truck gardens, hog fattening points and also the collection of wild plants." It is difficult to say for certain which wild plants are being collected to feed the Soviet servicemen. They may be roots, mushrooms, sorrel or nettles for soup. However, whatever type of plant the writer had in mind, it remains a fact that the collection of "wild plants" points to a serious shortage of supplies for the armed forces.

If the position is so acute in military units, speculation among the civilian population must be even more widespread and the shortages much more acute.

Y. Marin

Military Affairs

Problems of Disarmament

On May 11, 1955 the Soviet government published "A Proposal on Questions of Reducing Armaments, Banning Atomic Weapons and Eliminating the Threat of a New War."[1] Similar proposals have been made many times in the form of official statements, notes or representations and therefore the latest is not out of the ordinary.

The first act of Soviet diplomacy, at the first international conference attended by the Soviets, Genoa 1922, was to propose that the question of general disarmament be included in the agenda. The same proposition was made at their next conference, with the countries formed after the Revolution from the western areas of the former Russian Empire. This also took place in 1922. The Soviet plan envisaged a 75% cut in armed forces in the following two years.[2] In 1927 Soviet representatives outlined a project of immediate, general and complete disarmament to the preparatory commission and at the conference on disarmament of the League of Nations. After the rejection of the project, in the following year they proposed a progressive and proportional curtailment of armaments up to 50% of the existing level. In 1934 the USSR proposed turning the conference on disarmament into a "permanent peace conference."[3] Subsequent speeches by the Soviet representative Litvinov, right up to the Soviet Union's expulsion from the League of Nations for attacking Finland in 1939, repeatedly returned to the question of disarmament; and the Soviet government invariably used these statements to accuse the "capitalist" powers, at first Great Britain, France and Poland and later Italy and Germany, of disrupting the peaceful aspirations of the USSR.

After World War II Soviet diplomacy continued along this line. Disarmament proposals and their utilization by Soviet propaganda to demonstrate the peaceful nature of Soviet foreign policy and the sincerity of the USSR's desires for peaceful coexistence became even more pronounced, both at UN sessions and international conferences. In keeping with the intensified attention given the question of disarmament, Soviet propaganda became more widespread and took on definite forms. A permanent organ, the World Council of Peace, and numerous bodies such as the World Federation of Democratic Youth were founded. The unceasing activity of these organs in arranging conferences, congresses and meetings was to act as an indication of the importance attached by the Soviet government to the whole issue.

In view of the general abhorrence of war, the possibility of new and ever more powerful means of destruction being used provided Soviet propaganda with excellent vantage points. These positions were acquired in fairly wide circles

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[1] *Pravda*, May 11, 1955.

[2] G. Osnitskaya, "Disarmament," *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya*, (Large Soviet Encyclopedia), 1. ed., 1941, XLVIII, p. 158.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 159.

of the free world because of general ignorance of the basic theses of Communist theory on disarmament and failure to understand the aims of the present Soviet moves in this respect. Thus, to appreciate fully the significance of the latest Soviet proposal an understanding of this theory is essential.

By disarmament Soviet theoreticians mean the complete disbandment of armed forces or partial reduction and limitation of armaments.[4] However, this process cannot be realized under present conditions, when there are states with different political and economic systems. Disarmament can be effected "only as a result of the victory of the socialist revolution throughout the whole world."[5] Moreover, the idea of disarmament is "Utopia in a society based on class contrasts . . . The slogan of disarmament was used by the bourgeois pacifists and taken up by the Second International to deceive the masses thirsting for peace . . . In fact, the discussions on disarming served the imperialists as a cover for new rearming and war."[6]

The Soviet government, denying that disarmament can be realized before a socialist revolution had succeeded throughout the whole world, views all its activities as the unmasking of the "bourgeois pacifists," that is it pursues negative rather than positive aims:

> In order to unmask the bourgeois pacifists the Soviet government at the first international conference in which it participated [Genoa Conference, 1922] proposed the inclusion in the agenda of the question of general disarmament . . . The proposals of a socialist state on the subject of disarmament did not contradict the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, that disarmament is impossible under conditions of capitalism. On the contrary, they served as propaganda for this theory for the broad masses of the world's workers, since a rejection of these proposals by the capitalist states would have torn the mask of pacifism from them.[7]

This concept was predetermined by a basic tenet of Communist theory formulated by Lenin and Stalin on the temporary nature of a peaceful coexistence of two opposing systems and of the Soviet Union's task to support the "oppressed peoples" of other countries by "inciting them to rise against the capitalists and act, if necessary, with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states."[8]

In an article by Frunze, "The Military and Political Education of the Red Army," this idea is expressed even more clearly with no ambiguity:

> Among the nations, our proletarian state is a state of a completely different type. It sees its fundamental task in changing the whole foundation of the old bourgeois world . . . In view of this there exists between it and the other states a profound organic inimicality which cannot fail to bring these two types of state into conflict with one another . . . there is no doubt that there can be no question of a long, peaceful coexistence of these different types of state, of the two different

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 158.
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] *Ibid.*
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 159.
[8] Stalin, *Voprosy leninisma* (Questions of Leninism), Moscow, 1952, p. 104.

types of social systems . . . it is unavoidable that this struggle take the form of open armed conflict. It could also take other forms, but the essential basis of the mutual relations will not alter in the least.[9]

These declarations fully explain past Soviet tactics on the question of disarmament. The unrealizable demands for total disarmament were designed to discredit opponents or to ensure that the Soviet Union could make up the leeway in military development by demanding that her adversaries' armaments be curtailed. In later instances Soviet demands were more modest and contained concrete proposals. Thus, the Genoa Conference of 1922 was used as a propaganda platform for proposals of the first type; in the conference with the states formed after the Revolution from the western areas of the former Russian Empire more realistic proposals were made. Since this conference was held before the sweeping reorganization of the large, semipartisan army in existence after the Civil War into a small regular army—there being at that time insufficient arms for a large army as well as no military industry—the practicality of the Soviet proposals is quite evident. Both these motives have always played a decisive role in forming Soviet policy on questions of disarmament.

The Soviet note of May 11, 1955 must be viewed in this light. The proposal on disarmament is a declaration of the general principles of the subject, concrete proposals for an international convention on reducing arms and banning atomic weapons and a project for establishing an effective international control. This proposal was made in the form of a scheme for the General Assembly of the United Nations and speaks in its name. It was thus intended to be the basis of a new convention to be put to the United Nations for discussion.

The first part of the proposal, the declaration, merely repeats the usual Soviet line on armaments, the dangers of American bases and general comments on the world situation. The aim of the recommendations was given as the establishment of mutual trust and the ending of the cold war.[10] The only innovation was a comparatively objective tone and the absence of references to warmongers and Anglo-American imperialists.

The second part of the proposal was of greater interest. It contained detailed measures for reducing arms, establishing definite ceilings for the forces of the Big Four and China and a reduction in both conventional and new weapons. The size of the armed forces for the USSR, the USA and China was to be between 1 and 1.5 million men, for Great Britain and France 650,000. The reduction down to the established level was to be carried out in two one-year periods. In conjunction with this, military bases on foreign soil were to be removed within the two years and the testing and use of atomic weapons was to cease prior to their complete destruction.

Although the proposals on arms were nothing new the Soviet agreement to reduce her forces to a third of their present size was a new factor. Hitherto, all attempts on the part of the West in this direction had met with no success

[9] M. V. Frunze, *Izbrannye proizvedeniya* (Selected Works), Moscow, 1951, pp. 178—179.

[10] *Pravda*, May 11, 1955.

because of the Soviet demands for the abolition of atomic weapons as a condition. Arguments could be advanced that the Soviet agreement to reduce her forces to the established figure would prove a deception because of the quasi-military nature of the police who number between 800,000 and 900,000 and the members of the MVD and the Ministry of State Security. However, there is no doubt that the Soviets are prepared to reduce the size of their armed forces as shown by the third proposal to establish international control of arms reductions and ensure the ban on atomic weapons.

In this respect the Soviets have advanced a system which they believe to be effective. Arguing that it would be difficult to devise a method of supervision that would enjoy the confidence of all concerned, that obstacles could be put in the way of an inspection commission's access to the centers of industrial and military resources and that peacetime military and atomic production could easily be put onto a war footing, the Soviets proposed that control be established by setting up at all main railroad junctions, airfields, ports and main highways permament observers with the right of access to all information required to carry out the surveillance and to the budgetary allocations of the governments concerned.

This system presupposes that any preparation for a new war, even one involving atomic weapons, requires that large military formations armed with conventional weapons be concentrated at certain points. This concentration would necessitate movement through all the places enumerated which would thus be of major importance.[11]

The Soviet conception of a future war is open to dispute. A devastating atomic raid could be made on an enemy's key industrial and political centers without any preliminary massing of conventional forces or even airplanes. However, without engaging in polemics on the subject one fact seems of the utmost importance. For the first time the Soviet government has agreed, at least in theory, to permit a large body of foreign officials into the country. So far the attitude had always been that such a scheme was not in keeping with rights of sovereignty. Thus, although there is a considerable distance between the project and its realization, the new proposal is significant as it creates a precedent. The Soviets would have many ways of nullifying the effectiveness of this type of control even if it were introduced in its entirety. The difficulties that have arisen in Korea and Indo-China are a good indication in this respect. Moreover, the Soviet proposal envisages the application of sanctions on any violator of the convention by the Security Council, an organ which the Soviets themselves can paralyze by the use of the veto.

Nevertheless, no matter what measures were taken to circumvent the control, the Western authorities would be bound to obtain some information. This risk is not compensated for as far as the Soviet Union is concerned by the fact that she can place observers in the Western countries, for the secrets of the West are already fairly well-known to the Soviet leaders through the espionage

[11] *Ibid.*

network and groups of fellow-travelers they have in the countries of the free world. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that the Soviet project for control is an attempt to prove to the West that the USSR is sincere in her statement that she will agree to a drastic curtailment of her conventional arms if the free world will ban atomic weapons and the Americans will withdraw from their overseas bases.

The main reason that the Soviets are prepared to sacrifice a portion of their "position of strength" by reducing their large army, a not insignificant means of exerting psychological pressure in the cold war, is that, although Soviet military leaders stress the decisive role of conventional forces in a future war, they realize full well that a complete reorganization of their ground forces is needed in view of the coming atomic era. An indication of the reasons for this reorganization and the difficulties which will be encountered has already been given in an article entitled "Problems of Atomic Warfare and the Soviet Armed Forces."[12] It is obvious that the difficulties would be greater in the case of a large army than would be the case with smaller forces. It will be noted in this respect that Frunze's military reforms of 1924 were accompanied by a significant reduction in the size of the Red Army. The Soviets hope to be allowed to carry out this program in peace by sacrificing their huge army in return for a guarantee that the free world will waive its chief advantages, atomic weapons and the American bases.

Thus, the proposal for a reduction in arms is a result of the Soviets' need to obtain a breathing space, as they had not fully taken into consideration the difficulties of an arms race or the political and economic problems that would face them. It is also designed to counteract distrust and lessen the alertness of the West and to catch up in the development of atomic weapons. *N. Galay*

[12] *Bulletin*, Munich, April 1955, pp. 3—10.

Culture

The 1956 Soviet Inter-Republic Sports Competition

On February 17, 1955 the newspaper *Sovetsky sport* announced that the Committee for Physical Culture and Sport of the Council of Ministers of the USSR had decided to hold a sports meet during July-August 1956 in Moscow between teams from Moscow, Leningrad and the union republics. Included will be: gymnastics, swimming, diving, field events, water polo, rowing, basketball, volleyball, football, wrestling, boxing, weight lifting, fencing, shooting, cycling, equestrian events and the modern pentathlon. Valuable prizes are to be awarded to the winning teams. All measures connected with the preparation and carrying out of the competition are, it was stated, to be used to organize widespread cultural and recuperative recreation and to attract the younger generation to participate in physical culture and sport.[1]

[1] *Sovetsky sport*, Moscow, February 17, 1955.

Six months have passed since the publication of this announcement. Since then the project has been discussed by the Central Committee of the All-Union Lenin Komsomol, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, a number of Party oblast committees, several union and republic ministries as well as committees for physical culture and sport. Special meetings of the leading exponents of physical culture were held in several union republics and in Moscow. Representatives of Party, Komsomol, trade union and other organizations took part. In Estonia the main speaker at one of these meetings was the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Estonian SSR, Gren; in Belorussia the final words were delivered by the secretary of the Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party, Gorbunov, and in addition the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party, Patolichev, and the deputy of the Council of Ministers of the Belorussian SSR, Kiselev, participated; in Moscow in the debates at an All-Russian Congress of chairmen of city, oblast and krai committees for physical culture and sport, the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Lenin Komsomol, Semichastny, gave a speech. The importance attached by the leading Soviet organs and officials to the competition and the problems arising from it is quite evident from the attention being paid to them.

Since the republics of Tadzhikistan, Kazakhstan and Moldavia are to be represented by teams of 500 each it can be assumed that the total number of participants will be in the neighborhood of 10,000. In the eliminating contests millions of sportsmen will be involved. For instance in the preliminary contests organized by the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions which are to be held this summer about three million athletes will compete.[2]

There are indications of a considerable decline in physical culture and sport activities in the USSR in recent years. In the RSFSR, for example, the number of people taking part in gymnastics has been declining every year, and the numbers participating in light athletics, skiing and swimming have fallen by 89,000, 34,000 and 42,000 respectively.[3] In Belorussia, during the past two years the number of physical culture units has decreased with a corresponding drop of 300,000 members. There were four times fewer examinees for the badge "GTO" (Ready for Labor and Defense) in 1954 than in 1952.[4]

The committees for physical culture and sport, the central, oblast and town councils of DSO (Volunteer Sport Societies) have been devoting most of their attention to the limited circle of sportsmen who are involved in the actual competitions, and the lower echelons of the collectives have received but scant attention. This had led to a deterioration in the work of the latter. Another feature is that even in the organized groups the standard leaves much to be desired. For example, in the RSFSR although there are 246,00 "organized" swimmers there are only six Masters of Sport in swimming.[5]

[2] *Ibid.*, April 7, 1955.
[3] *Ibid.*, March 24, 1955.
[4] *Ibid.*, May 5, 1955.
[5] *Ibid.*, March 24, 1955.

Thus the projected competition aims not merely at arousing mass interest in sport and physical culture but also at improving the general standard of physical training among the younger generation. However, all is not well. The Council of Ministers of the RSFSR has pointed out the poor quality of the physical training of students, while *Pravda* stated that the majority of schools are failing to meet the physical culture norms required before pupils go on to the universities. Complaints are also made that the universities are neglecting the matter and physical culture is not being carried out on a mass scale.

Soviet sportsmen have recently lost a number of world and European titles. At the same time the establishment of new records at any level is becoming progressively more difficult. Therefore, the Soviet Union is in need of new reserves of strength if it is to maintain or improve its present high position in international sports. However, the number and quality of the replacements is a source of misgiving to the Soviets.

At the end of 1954 *Izvestia* was lamenting the gap between the top athletes and the general level. Semichastny, too, indicated that the amount of attention being given to the different categories was not proportional. In an effort to stimulate the training of more athletes to a higher level, the condition has been made that no one below Class I could participate in the actual competitions.[6]

This condition will create difficulties for a number of the union republics. Thus, the Kazakh SSR is obliged to send 29 swimmers of Class I and above, but has only one at this level.[7] The position is similar in the Tadzhik SSR, which has to provide 500 sportsmen of the required standard but has only 150.[8] It is evident that there will have to be feverish activity in these republics if the required number of athletes is to be produced. It is entirely possible that not all of them will be able to cope with the task. However, there is also no doubt that a number of talented sportsmen will be found among the masses.

The Soviets are almost certainly treating these competitions as a form of preliminary to the 1956 Olympic Games in Melbourne. They may even be cherishing the hope that the competitions will eclipse the Olympic Games both in the number of participants and in the actual results. The propaganda value of this is as obvious as it would be great. *S. Yu. Volk*

[6] Approximately inter-collegiate level.

[7] *Ibid*, April 7, 1955.

[8] *Ibid*., April 5, 1955.

REVIEWS

Kommunist

Organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
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Following recent custom very little material of a non-theoretical nature appears in this number of *Kommunist*. In fact only two articles may be placed in this category. One is the editorial "On Strengthening Friendship between the Soviet and Yugoslav Peoples," which is not of great interest, merely repeating the nebulous communiqués which followed the Soviet-Yugoslav talks. The second is by V. Evseev, secretary of the Kuibyshev Party obkom and entitled "Party Organization and Problems of Construction." It owes its appearance in *Kommunist* to the fact that the construction of a power plant in the Kuibyshev region took precedence over all others in the Soviet Union. It is the usual type of article, stressing particularly the role of the Party organization as an executive center in this important sector of the economy.

The first theoretical article to be considered is "V. I. Lenin on the Specificity of Truth," by N. Kristosturyan. This abstract theme continues and analyzes more profoundly the very important theoretical problem of relations between materialism and idealism which has already been discussed in several numbers of *Kommunist*.

The article begins by revealing a persistent struggle between these two ideologies and states "the problem of truth occupies a central position in the sharp struggle between materialism and idealism; its solution will have great theoretical and practical significance."

The author begins his article in a very aggressive mood, in which he attacks pragmatism. The latter school has, incidentally, been particularly vituperated of late in the central Communist press, although nowhere is pragmatism more clearly manifested than in the Soviet Union.

A close examination of this article reveals the very interesting fact that the struggle against idealism is essentially one of the colds war's facets the Soviet leaders are trying in every way to conceal. Previously, Soviet propaganda was directed against shortcomings in the capitalist system or it hyperbolized practical defects; now the theoretical front represents the chief sector of the cold war. The Communists have set themselves the task of discrediting their "adversary" on ideological grounds by extolling Communist dogma and transferring Marxism from the category of economic theories to that of pure philosophy. Soviet theoreticians are doing their utmost to prove the groundlessness of idealistic ideologies. Kristosturyan writes:

> Contemporary idealism in various forms propagates, overtly or covertly, the concept of the inferiority of man's mind, of his incapacity to know natural and social laws and to utilize the knowledge gained from his practical activity.

He then confronts idealism with Communism and states:

> Pessimistic preachings on the incognizance of natural laws and in particular those of social development ... are aimed primarily against Marxist philosophy and are ultimately linked with attempts by modern reactionary bourgeois philosophy and sociology to "prove" the stability of the capitalist order.

The author subsequently plunges into the labyrinth of theoretical investigations, quoting liberally from Marx and even more from Lenin, dealing with such issues as the capacity for thought and its biological justification and the socio-historical conditions of social development. Nor does Kristosturyan neglect his main task of disseminating the Communist viewpoint, which is to assert the hegemony of Marxism in philosophy. This move may be clearly understood, particularly if it is remembered that Communist theoreticians themselves appreciate how outmoded the Marxist approach has become. This highly restrictive and not very practical theory has been overshadowed by more liberal, modern ones. Consequently the Soviets are attempting to avert the potential danger of the situation with the inadequate means at their disposal.

By his so-called detailed analysis of phenomena pertaining to the specificity of truth, the author is able to falsify philosphical theses and create the impression of the superiority of Marxist theory. While accusing advocates of all other trends of practicing sophistry, he himself makes wide use of sophistic and eclectic methods. He asserts for example "... subjectivism which is produced by relativism together with metaphysical insensitivity, characteristic of dogmatism, are both equally alien to genuine scientific theory."

Kristosturyan accompanies these philosophical reflections with attacks on certain deviationist and oppositional tendencies. It should be noted that, prior to Stalin's death, directives were frequently issued on elucidating Marxism, and Party theoreticians were obliged to employ all manner of subterfuge in their arguments. Since Stalin's death, the Soviet leaders have mobilized their entire Marxist arsenal and staff of theoreticians to defend their positions. This is important to them, especially since the entry of additional countries into the Soviet orbit, whose leaders must be given the relevant theoretical directives. The latter view is supported by Kristosturyan, who writes in the concluding part of his article "... the foundation of materialist dialectics on the specificity of truth serves the Communist Parties in all countries as the leading concept in solving their problems."

L. Gatovsky's article, "The Role of Soviet Trade in Socialist Reproduction," is also theoretical in nature, despite its apparent practical title. The author tries to provide trade under Soviet conditions with a philosophical justification. He writes: "In a socialist society the sphere of commodity production and turnover is strictly limited. This is determined by the very nature of socialist production methods."

The Soviet trade system differs completely from all others and its artificiality is very evident. Nevertheless Gatovsky raises it to a philosophical doc-

trine. This is not accidental. By such a move he can justify to some extent the obvious shortcomings of the Soviet trade apparatus and at the same time substantiate Soviet attempts to achieve hegemony in the world's markets. Gatovsky's task is hindered by serious difficulties introduced by the founders of Communist dogma—Marx, Engels, and especially Lenin. They explained that in a socialist society distribution must prevail over trade. As this is not the case in Soviet practice Gatovsky writes:

> The gradual transition to direct distribution will not be achieved by eliminating trade and offering goods free of charge to the population, but as a result of an increase in goods which will pass through the usual trade channels at ever-decreasing prices. The overall development of Soviet trade is the pressing task during the entire period of socialist construction and of the gradual transition from socialism to Communism.

Developing his theoretical grounds for the Soviet trade system, Gatovsky makes use of the complete machinery of Marxism. He speaks of the special features of cooperative trade, of the differences between urban and rural trade etc. Any other interpretation of the Soviet trade apparatus is inevitably quashed.

It must be admitted that Gatovsky maneuvers very skilfully between such concepts and theses as wage-leveling and high prices or supplying a restricted section of the population with those goods most in short supply at low prices as opposed to inadequately supplying even the basic needs of the majority of the population.

I. Trakhtenberg's "The Fundamental Laws of Regularity and Features of Economic Crises" is also a theoretical article. It's content has been conditioned also by earlier circumstances in the Soviet Union. Before World War II the USSR, completely isolated from the rest of the world, could depict the horrors of the capitalist order and not fear any refutation. The situation has changed radically now following contact with the Western world. Many of the Soviet population, including those who served in various countries during World War II, witnessed the extent of aid given to the USSR by America, England and other allies. Such contact made many Soviets realize that the free world with its high technological standards, its production potential and achievements in satisfying the population's needs, obviously surpassed the Soviet socialist state. It has therefore become urgently necessary to find some way of explaining such a disadvantageous superiority. Trakhtenberg writes accordingly:

> Capitalism develops in a zigzag line. The alternation of rise and fall proceeds with a definite consistency. The capitalist economy develops in successive cycles. Each cycle consists of . . . a crisis, a depression, a recovery and a rise.

A hastily prepared graph helps the author to explain certain matters which could prove puzzling to the Soviet citizen. It enables him to dwell in detail on the above-mentioned cycles and to prophesy future crises in the capitalist

system. In this respect the sophistry of this theoretician attains astonishing heights. He resorts to all kinds of economic digressions to show the capitalist system's inferiority to the socialist system and that the future belongs to the latter. He even enumerates the various stages through which capitalist society must pass and which will lead invariably to its final destruction. He writes:

> Together with the transition from crisis to depression, from depression to recovery and from recovery to rise, an exacerbation of contradictions in reproduction and consumption is particularly sharp. Conditions necessary for realization are increasingly violated, disproportion grows and as a result a crisis ensues.

Sophistic subtleties permit Trakhtenberg to discredit the capitalist economy. It is clear that he must deal very warily with issues such as the flexibility of the Western world's system and the superiority of free competition. Yet he cannot avoid all mention of these factors. His solution is to point out the achievements of competition but to stress concurrently that an increase in any one sector is ruinous for a whole series of others. He asserts, for example, that sharp competition in the automobile industry led to an increase in automobile production and at the same time to the bankruptcy of many firms.

Other theoretical articles in this number of *Kommunist* include one by N. Inozemtsev entitled "The American Policy of a Position of Strength and Western Europe." Now, it seems, even the anti-American campaign is being transferred to a theoretical level. For example, the author attempts to justify theoretically the increase in conflict between capitalist circles in NATO countries as well as the fact that the policy of a position of strength is not proving advantageous for the United States. There are a number of digressions into Soviet foreign policy in this article, but they play a minor role.

The "Review of Magazines" in this number is rather significant. It consists of a number of theoretical directives from the Communist Party to the editorial staffs of Soviet Literary magazines such as *Novy Mir, Oktyabr, Znamya, Zvezda* and *Neva*. The authors of these directives are three experienced journalists, B. Agapov, B. Galin and D. Zaslavsky, who have been brought together by *Kommunist* to ensure an attentive audience among the staffs of leading literary magazines. Basically, this review urges literary publications to pay particular attention to socio-political articles, to improve their quality and increase their number. It is the latter type of article which reflects the official Party line or at least some current aspect of it.

The final section of this number of *Kommunist*, "Criticism and Bibliography," is more theoretical than normally is the case. Instead of the usual reviews there are articles based on several books which greatly interest Soviet propagandists. These books include Jawaharlal Nehru's *The Discovery of India*, issued by the Foreign Literature Publishing House in Moscow, and the *Historia Mundi* published by the Francke Verlag in Bern.

I. Kostin

The Seizure of Power

By Czeslaw Milosz

Published by *Criterion Books, Inc.*, New York, 1955, 246 Pages

Mr. Milosz, the author of *The Captive Mind* (1953), is one of the most remarkable men to come out of Eastern Europe since the "seizure of power" by the Communists. He is remarkable not only for his great gifts as a writer, but also for his civic and intellectual courage. It is only too easy for a refugee from a totalitarian regime to shock his complacent readers with tales of physical and mental terror: these tales, as the Western world knows by now, are only too true. Mr. Milosz has accomplished something far more difficult by explaining the subtler and more sinister process by means of which men are not broken, but mentally turned inside out. True, George Orwell's nightmarish *1984* contained certain profound passages in this vein. So did Koestler's *Darkness at Noon*. But what in the case of these two older writers was intuitive guess (as with Orwell) or brilliant psychological induction (as with Koestler), has been life itself in the case of Milosz.

His first book was a terrifying disclosure of the totalitarian method of corruption from within. The great temptation is the Hegelian or Marxian form of fatalism to which the twentieth century intellectual appears to be fatally susceptible. Tell a modern writer that Communism has been "scientifically" proved to be the final phase towards which all human history has been moving; tell him that it is something "inevitable," and not only is he likely to accept that power, but will also gradually convince himself that it is something ethically good, precisely *because* it is inevitable. Such was the lesson of Mr. Milosz's first book. And because it was based on a deeply personal experience, it shook the Western reader who perhaps, for the first time, understood that Communism was not only an evil physical fact, but an equally evil spiritual reality.

One was looking forward to Mr. Milosz's second book in the hope that he would provide in it something of that antidote which he must have discovered in his own mind when he overcame that great temptation and broke with the regime. In this sense, *The Seizure of Power* is a disappointment. The note struck by *The Captive Mind* has not been sustained. Perhaps the fault is purely formal. (Mr. Milosz's new book is a novel). The problem of the modern political novel still remains to be solved, and Mr. Milosz's attempt is yet another failure in this field. The story is too disjointed, the scene laid out is too vast and the figures inhabiting it flit by too fast and are too pale to leave a lasting impression with the reader.

The Seizure of Power pursues the fates of several Poles in the terrible years of the war and the first postwar years. Some of them are sincere Communists; others, like the main hero, Peter Kwinto (in whom one may detect certain autobiographical traits of the author), half-hearted, tormented fellow-travelers; others, again, active rebels. There are Russian MVD officers, Polish peasants, Jews and anti-Semites, partisans turned bandit and workers turned partisan.

The social backgrounds, characters and fates of these men are different. What is common to them is the awareness that the past is gone for good. As to the rest, they are lost amidst the orgy of the cosmic forces of evil and destruction raging in the land. If they are to live, they have to find some relationship to the chaos surrounding them. The tragedy, however, is that the only group among them that knows, (or pretends to know), what it is all about are the Communists. And it is this allegedly "scientifically" based knowledge of the Communists allied with their power that acts as a magnet on the bewildered and lost men groping their ways amidst the ruins of the past.

The gradual process of corruption is indicated in the thoughts of Peter Kwinto. An outward conformism, mingled with a naive Machiavellianism, is the first stage; that is how he comforts himself:

> The whole secret lay in a pliant yielding to social pressure; it was important not to believe too much in what was recommended ... and not to believe too little ... The new system was just like a big school, and millions of people had discovered its mechanism. It was not in the least important to accept it with sincerity; but when expressing an opinion, it was necessary to make internal arrangements to insure that you really believed what you were saying. Five minutes later you could begin to doubt privately (as in school in front of the blackboard) every single word.

That's how it begins. But, soon the tone is already different:

> I don't know which is worse: that past or the iron present of the Communists. I'm trying to understand and can't. Over there [*i. e.*, in Russia], they've made a horrible parody of it. And now the whole of Europe lies open to them. One day something new *must* come out of it.

Peter Kwinto's mother, a simple, unsophisticated soul who tries to set him right:

> What begins with a lie will remain a lie... You talk the way you do because you have to. Anyone who speaks the way he has to speak, begins to think what he's got to think.

The struggle is joined. On the one side, the straightforward ethical sense saying: It is an evil thing, and I cannot accept it, even if it is inevitable. On the other, there is the subtle appeal to the sense of belonging to a force which is engaged in molding history. The Communist Baruga, with whom Peter Kwinto is talking, puts it this way:

> He [Peter] had been hit too hard for it not to have left deep traces. Anyone who had tasted that bitter draught, walked around looking normal—but with everything inside turned upside down ... Give him *Gemuetlichkeit* and he will moan and wriggle; a small part of him was missing, something which once made all that acceptable to him. And he will be choked by the senselessness of life. That's where we catch them. When they begin to recognize the nonsense of life, they're ours. Then they have to act—at any price. And who but we can give them the moment of delight, of enchantment, the sense that they are demigods?

And Peter begins to respond to it:

> If a man is subjected to oppression—completely—he reaches a limit where what he hates turns into an object of worship. He doesn't want to admit it; it's very unpleasant. But the only salvation seems to be to move closer to the center of strength than anybody else, closer to the source of grace and warmth . . .

The novel ends with Peter's escape abroad. But it is not a real solution. His doubts go with him; and at home, in Poland, there are still thousands of men like Peter, fighting, succumbing to, and, in some cases, conquering the great temptation. Mr. Milosz's great merit lies in having shown up something of the mental anguish which makes people into fellow-travelers and even Communists. To have done so with insight and charity is an act of great courage, greater perhaps than his decision to break with the regime. *Victor Frank*

Labor Productivity in Soviet and American Industry

By Walter Galenson

Published by *Columbia University Press*, New York, 1955, 274 Pages

The appearance of the work under review may be considered very timely. At present the chief theme in Soviet economic literature is the demand that the productivity of labor in branches of heavy industry, transport and construction be increased. The coal industry, ferrous metallurgy, the timber and oil industries consistently fail to meet their labor productivity goals.

One reason the Soviets pay so much attention to the increase of labor productivity is that it is one of the basic ideological principles of the Communist Party. Lenin stated that the Soviet state was faced with the task of "creating a higher social structure than capitalism, that is, of increasing the productivity of labor." Elsewhere Lenin wrote "The productivity of labor is, in the last analysis, the most important and principal factor for the victory of the new social system." (*Collected Works*, XXIX, 394.) Another important reason for the great attention given this question is that an increase in productivity is essential if the strategic potential of the country is to be raised and manpower reserves increased.

Before World War II the USSR lagged behind several European countries as far as labor productivity was concerned and was far behind the United States in this respect. Since the war, although the Soviet Union has overtaken certain European countries, it is still far behind the United States. In certain branches of the economy, such as the coal industry, the gap between productivity in the two countries is even becoming greater.

The strategic aims of the Soviets require increased armament in the countries of the Eastern bloc and the rendering of considerable aid to Communist China in its industrialization program. In order to do this, a great increase in capital accumulation and investment will be necessary. However, there is a definite limit to the rapid extension of production capacity just as there is a limit to the degree

to which the standard of living of the Soviet population can be reduced. The Soviet authorities are therefore faced with the task of intensifying the production processes as much as possible and at the same time of increasing the worker's wage to the maximum.

Consequently, there has been recently a powerful campaign, which launched appeals that productivity be increased in every way possible. The Soviet press, and issue No. 4 for 1955 of *Voprosy ekonomiki* in particular, have thrown light on the existing situation.

Together with its appeals to raise productivity inside the USSR, the Soviet press has been printing false data on the productivity of labor in the Western countries. For this reason the appearance of Prof. Galenson's work is exceptionally timely, since it fills a gap in foreign literature on labor in the Soviet Union.

The author's aim is to follow the development of productivity in Soviet industry since 1928 and to compare the situation in the USSR with that in the United States of America. His work will long be used as a reference on productivity in the free world compared with that in the forced economy of planned socialism.

A very positive feature of this work is that the author does not limit his task to a careful collation of much statistical information, but he has also attempted to establish the relative comparability of Soviet and American statistics. This theoretical section of the book is of no less interest than the later sections which deal with the dynamics of labor productivity in the basic branches of heavy industry—coal mining, iron ore mining, crude oil and natural gas extraction, iron and steel, machinery construction, shoe manufacturing and sugar beet processing.

We have no special comments on the first two chapters. Galenson quite correctly points out the difficulties which arise in utilizing Soviet statistical sources. Since 1936 comparatively few Soviet reports on industry in the USSR have been published and this makes comparison with countries of the free world difficult. Towards the end of the 1930's the greater part of such information was kept secret as a matter of policy.

Galenson assumes that Soviet statistics do not give deliberately false information in reports, but simply that the truth is veiled by leaving gaps. This assumption must be correct, since it is unlikely that there are two different systems of statistics, one for use by government departments and one for propaganda purposes. Information which the government believes essential to conceal is declared secret and not published. Information, the true significance of which should not become available to the masses, is published in veiled form or is presented in such a way that it is unintelligible without a key. The Soviets frequently change their statistical categories, and they prefer to give percentage figures with little concrete information on whose basis a meaningful comparison could be made. The classical example is the change in the basis for establishing gross production—the change from constant to current prices.

In defining the productivity of labor in the Soviet coal industry the author writes that productivity in the coal industry is calculated on the basis of the labor force engaged in the "operation" of the mines and that the significance of this term is not entirely clear. A Soviet work has, however, been recently received in the West, which makes clear which processes are included in the term "operation." It is *Ekonomika, organizatsiya i planirovanie ugolnoi promyshlennosti SSSR* (The Economics, Organization and Planning of the Coal Industry of the USSR), by A. Zvorykin, D. Kirzhner and M. Kundin. The information it gives indicates that Galenson is incorrect in assuming that the coal washing and separating processes also form part of the "operation."

This work also quotes a higher labor productivity before the war than does Galenson—23.8 tons of coal monthly per miner in 1937 against Galenson's 23.5 tons, which is based on prewar data published in *Planovoe khozyaistvo* in 1939. It should be pointed out that Soviet industrial statistics and other Soviet sources at the present time cite other data than those which were accepted in prewar editions (for example, the total labor force in 1940, the gross coal output in the same year).

After a careful examination and comparison of Soviet sources, the author draws the conclusion that the average output of one worker in the Soviet coal industry was 315 tons in 1938 as compared with 787 tons for the American miner. The labor productivity of the Soviet miner at that time was therefore 40% of the American miner's. Since the author's figures are in most cases generous towards the Soviet mining industry, 40% represents the upper limit.

Galenson's figures for 1950 cite 30% as the corresponding relationship; and, although this is a strikingly low figure, the author's reasoning and his evaluation of the sources are quite reasonable. As the Soviet press reported, it was not until 1951 that labor productivity in the USSR exceeded the prewar level. The US industry, on the other hand, continued its progress uninterrupted.

Even in 1953 there were comparatively more workers employed in many mining operations than before the war, despite increased mechanization. In 1954, however, an improvement was brought about, and labor productivity exceeded the prewar level by 20%. On the basis of the author's data, it may be concluded that productivity of labor in Soviet coal mines was in 1954 about 38% of that in American mines, which would indicate that the Soviet level is still behind that achieved before the war.

The position in ferrous metallurgy is somewhat different. Here the postwar achievements are quite considerable, and labor productivity in blast furnace production, for example, approaches that of the US. It is therefore to be regretted that the author ends his study with the prewar period and only mentions the postwar period in passing.

The author correctly classifies the production processes which are linked with iron and steel manufacture. It should be pointed out that steel tubing, as a product of rolling mills, has been included in rolled steel production and those

workers engaged in the manufacture of the tubing have been included in the number of production workers in ferrous metallurgy.

Galenson calculates, after a discussion of the Soviet sources and the necessary conversion factors to be employed, that one blast furnace worker in the Soviet Union produced on the average 690 tons in 1937 as opposed to 1,641 tons in the United States. The Soviet worker's labor productivity was therefore only 43% of his American counterpart's. A comparable prewar Soviet figure is 47% (756 tons annually in the Soviet Union and 1,620 tons in the United States) which is, as might be expected, somewhat higher than Galenson's figure.

Approximately the same relationship prevailed before the war in the production of steel and rolled metal, where Soviet labor productivity is again about 43% of that in the US. Since the war, however, very little has been published on labor productivity in steel and rolled metal production. Consequently, Galenson limits his treatment of the postwar period to the mention that Soviet sources report labor productivity in 1950 to have been 33% higher in metallurgy than before the war, and in 1952 to have been 57% higher (p. 136).

However, at the present time sufficient material is available to show that the productivity of labor rose considerably during the Fifth Five-Year Plan and began to approach the American level. Care should therefore be taken not to give the American reader the impression that Soviet metallurgy is still far behind the United States in this respect.

On the basis of data provided by Academician Gudtsov in *Novy mir*, No. 3, 1953 and other sources, it can be calculated that the labor productivity of the Soviet blast furnace worker was at least 70% of his American counterpart's in 1950. In the last four or five years the gap has been narrowed and does not now exceed 20%. However accurate the figures for the prewar years may have been, is should not be forgotten that they are now only of historical interest, and it would have been preferable if the author had used perhaps less accurate, but more modern information in this respect. In assessing the economic potentialities of the USSR it is probably better to permit a certain exaggeration rather than an underestimation of that country's industrial capacity.

Evidence of the considerable progress made in the last 15 to 20 years in the Soviet Union is provided by the reduction in numbers of personnel serving blast furnaces. Galenson mentions that before the war one blast furnace in Magnitogorsk was operated by 150 workers; at present it requires only 93. Although this plant is something of an exception and reductions have not occurred on the same scale elsewhere, the productivity of labor has in general risen considerably. Whereas in 1940 a worker produced 692.8 tons of steel, in 1954 the figure was 1,250 tons, thus approaching the American level. In rolled steel production, however, labor productivity has not increased to the same extent.

The Soviet Union has made considerable progress in raising the productivity of labor in machine construction. However, the increased mechanization introduced into the Soviet industry has been paralleled in every respect by the

United States. Consequently it may be assumed that Galenson's comparative data on American and Soviet labor productivity in this branch of the economy, which refers to the prewar period, is also valid at the present time.

The author has also made an exhaustive study of labor productivity questions in the textile, footwear and sugar refining industries.

The work as a whole is a brilliant example of the economic research which makes it possible to broaden our knowledge of the Soviet economic system. The author has adopted a fruitful method, which is able to circumvent the considerable difficulties arising in comparing Soviet and foreign industrial statistics.

P. Poplujko

Publications of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR:

A. ADAMOVICH. Yakub Kolas' Resistance to Sovietization. Series I (Printed Editions), No. 20, 56 pp. (In Belorussian).

During the early period of his literary activity (1917—25) Yakub Kolas, the Belorussian poet, wrote a long poem entitled "Simon the Musician." The critics are unanimously agreed that this work is the poet's best. It marks an entire period of Kolas' resistance to Sovietization, and Adamovich's work is primarily devoted to this creation.

The poet completed the first edition of "Simon the Musician" in 1917/18. Adamovich's research deals very thoroughly with the history of this edition and proves once and for all the allegoric nature of the poem, a thesis already put forward by previous critics and admitted, although with limitations and distortions, by Soviet critics as well. The anti-Soviet tendency of the poem is revealed for the first time. Previously there had only been hints of this in criticism.

Adamovich also reveals the anti-Soviet orientation of several of Kolas' other works which he wrote at the time he was completing the first edition of "Simon" and between the first and second editions.

The new edition of "Simon" was undertaken by the author in 1924 and 1925 when the Soviet censorship had already gained firm control of literature.

Adamovich demonstrates the effect of censorship pressure on Kolas and the changes it necessitated in the text, chiefly in places where the first edition had been clearly nationalistic and, in particular, where it had been religious in tone. However, as a kind of revenge for the concessions he was forced to make to ensure the appearance of the second edition, the poet succeeded in strengthening and clarifying the anti-Soviet tendencies contained in the allegories of the first edition.

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G. KALINOVSKY. The State of the Soviet Milk Industry in the Pre- and Postwar Years. Series II (Mimeographed Publications), No. 29, 100 pp.

On the basis of Soviet material and his own experiences, the author outlines the state of livestock raising and the milk industry. In spite of the government's unceasing efforts and a certain amount of progress, this branch of the economy has not reached the desired level, even in the postwar period. This, the author believes, is the result of extreme bureaucratization, which deprives the producers of a direct and personal interest in their work and hampers initiative.

*

S. DYACHENKO. On Kolkhoz Organization in the USSR, Series II (Mimeographed Publications), No. 30, 41 pp.

This work comprises two parts, "Labor Reserves in the Soviet Kolkhozes and their Utilization" and "The Results of Kolkhoz Consolidation in the Central and Southern Chernozem Regions of the USSR." Much detailed information is given on the organization of the collective farms. The author's view is that the kolkhozes have a surplus of unused manpower which will progressively increase

as agriculture is mechanized. Kolkhoz consolidation has not improved the agricultural situation. It has rather brought on a crisis and cut short the three-year plan for the development of livestock raising.

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UKRAINIAN REVIEW. No. 2, 1955, 144 pp. (In Ukrainian).

The purpose of the Ukrainian Review, as expressed in its foreword, is to provide the scholar with an integrated and documented picture of the Bolshevik system of power, using the Ukraine as an example.

The second issue contains the following articles: "Ukrainian Finance as Part of the Soviet Financial System" by E. Glowinskyj; "Mazepa and Soviet Historiography" by B. Krupnyckyj; "Conditioned Reflexes and Despotism" by A. Hirsch; "The Problem of Soil Amelioration in the Ukraine and the Crimea" by A. Lebed; "The Ukrainian Village from 1931 to 1933" by D. Solovey; "Facts and Figures on the Ukrainian Famine in 1932–1933" by P. Lutarewytch; and "Puberty and Adolescence as Seen by Soviet Educators and Psychologists" by O. Kultchitsky.

In his article, Glowinskyj brings out the fact that, despite the nominal federal organization of the Soviet Union, the financial system is highly centralized. There is a unified state budget, of which the budgets of all the union republics are a part. On the basis of the latest Soviet literature on economics, the author concludes that the predominance of the Union is secure in all phases of life—political, economic, military, legal and cultural. Analyzing the budget of the Ukraine as a part of the overall Soviet financial system, the author is left with the conviction that there is a certain exploitation of the Ukraine for the benefit of Moscow and some of the economically underdeveloped republics.

Prof. Krupnyckyj considers the question of the attitude of Soviet historiography to the prominent Ukrainian figure, Hetman Ivan Mazepa. Although in the early days of the Bolshevik regime it was possible to consider this Ukrainian statesman in a more or less objective fashion, in recent years Soviet history has returned to the attitude of the Tsarist times and declared Mazepa a traitor.

Dr. Hirsch clarifies the fact, little known in the West, as to how the Soviets are using I. Pavlov's theory on conditioned reflexes to educate the younger generation.

A. Lebed considers the problems of soil amelioration in the Ukraine and the Crimea from the standpoint of its benefit to Ukrainian agriculture. He points out that some of the grandiose projects undoubtedly have a strategic significance.

Solovey and Lutarewytch provide some hitherto unpublished information on the famine in the Ukraine in 1932–33.

Kulchitsky compares Soviet and Western psychology and comes to the conclusion that there is no essential difference between them.

CHRONICLE OF EVENTS

(As reported by the Soviet Press and Radio)

August 1955

1 Report of arrival in Moscow of P. S. Lokanatan, Executive Secretary of UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

Molotov receives Li San Cho, North Korean Ambassador in Moscow in connection with forthcoming presentation by the latter of his credentials.

Publication of proposal by Philippine Congressman Pedro Lopez on establishment of diplomatic and trade relations between Philippines and USSR.

Report on arrival in Moscow of Swedish artists from Stockholm Royal Opera House and the Swedish Variety Theater.

Mixed Soviet-Iranian Commission begins work in Iranian Astara on defining and revising the Soviet-Iranian border.

Report on signature of supplementary barter agreement between Yugoslavia and USSR totaling 12 billion dollars.

Report on opening in Kiev under control of Ukrainian Academy of Sciences of an Institute of Powder Metallurgy and Special Alloys.

Delegation of Soviet scholars, headed by Academician A. P. Topchiev, leaves Moscow for London to participate in conference dealing with nature and extent of the threat to humanity presented by experiments with the atomic bomb and its use in war.

Report on opening in Warsaw of Fifth World Festival of Youth.

A delegation of French workers from the Renault factory leaves Moscow for home.

Yugoslav parliamentary delegation headed by B. Bakarić, Chairman of the Assembly of the Croat People's Republic, leaves Belgrade by plane for Moscow.

2 Team of Soviet sportsmen leaves Moscow for Stockholm to participate in the pentathlon.

Italian Minister of Foreign Trade Mattarella receives V. Salimovsky, new Soviet trade representative in Italy.

Soviet-Korean Friendship Month begins in Pyongyang.

A. P. Volkov, Chairman of the Soviet of the Union, and V. T. Lacis, Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities, receive Yugoslav parliamentary delegation upon their arrival in Moscow.

Secretariat of World Peace Council in Vienna publishes appeal on the elimination of the danger of an atomic war.

Soviet delegation of agricultural experts leaves London for home.

3 Li San Cho, North Korean Ambassador to Moscow, presents his credentials to Voroshilov, Chairman of Presidium of Supreme Soviet.

Chief Editor of *Pravda*, D. T. Shepilov, leaves Cairo for Moscow.

4 F. Mansell, Mayor of Wolverhampton, and British Member of Parliament D. Baird arrive in Moscow.

Third Session of the Fourth Convocation of the Supreme Soviet opens in Moscow.

British football team arrives in Moscow.

Official report published in Vienna on the transfer to the Austrian government of enterprises controlled by the Administration of Soviet Property in Austria.

A. I. Mikoyan awarded Order of Lenin on his 50th birthday in connection with his services in the field of aircraft construction.

5 Bulganin's speech at the Third Session of the Supreme Soviet published.

Soviet delegation leaves Moscow for Hiroshima to participate in a conference directed against the employment of atomic and thermonuclear weapons.

Meeting in Moscow of the Soviet parliamentary group which forms part of the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

Delegation of geologists and mining engineers from Asiatic countries and the Far East arrives in the Soviet Union.

6 Publication of notes exchanged between the Soviet government and the German Federal Republic on the establishment of direct diplomatic, trade and cultural relations between the two countries.

Publication of Supreme Soviet decree on Bulganin's report on the results of the Geneva Conference.

Johannes König appointed East German Ambassador to USSR.

Group of Yugoslav journalists leaves Moscow for home.

Soviet chess players leave for Sweden to attend a congress of the International Chess Federation.

Soviet, Belorussian and Ukrainian delegations arrive in Geneva to attend international conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

7 Bulganin receives foreign diplomatic representatives.

8 Publication of telegram from Bulganin to the chairman of the international conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Temporary Soviet chargé d'affaires in the United States, S. R. Striganov, visits the State Department.

Moscow opening of the All-Russian Conference of Education Workers dealing with improvement of discipline among pupils.

Afghanistan People's Council confirms the Soviet-Afghan agreement on transit questions.

9 Third Plenary Session of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions takes place in Moscow.

10 Albanian agricultural delegation arrives in Moscow.

11 A. Wauters, Belgian Ambassador to Moscow, leaves for home.

Marshal of Aviation F. Ya. Falaleev dies.

12 Trade Agreement between Italy and the USSR for 1955 signed in Moscow.

Report of Soviet Embassy in Austria published on the readiness of the Soviet government to transfer to the Austrian government without compensation rolling stock taken by the USSR as war booty.

13 Tass report on Soviet government decision to reduce the number of men in the armed forces by 640,000 by December 15, 1955.

Chief Editor of the Philippine newspaper *The Manila Chronicle*, E. del Rosario, arrives in Moscow.

Delegation of Indian specialists arrives in Moscow.

Voroshilov awards the "Badge of Honor" to diplomats at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for prolonged meritorious service.

14 P. S. Lokanatan leaves Moscow for home.

Soviet government delegation arrives in Pyongyang.

15 Fifth World Youth Festival ends in Warsaw.

Mufti Ishan ibn Abdulmadzhitkhan awarded Red Banner of Labor.

16 Voroshilov awards Metropolitan Nikolai the Red Banner of Labor.

M. Avad el Kuni, Egyptian Ambassador to the USSR, arrives in Moscow.

Agreement signed in Helsinki on scientific and technical cooperation between Finland and the USSR.

18 A delegation of the agricultural committee of the Norwegian parliament arrives in Moscow.

Indian football team arrives in Moscow.

Czechoslovak government delegation arrives in Moscow.

Yugoslav parliamentary delegation returns home from Moscow.

19 East German Ambassador to the USSR, J. König, arrives in Moscow.

A. P. Volkov, Chairman of the Soviet of the Union, receives Z. Firlinger, Chairman of the Czech National Assembly.

20 Publication of notes exchanged between USSR and Western Germany on talks between government delegations of the two countries.

21 Khrushchev arrives in Bucharest.

Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

Yugoslav parliamentary delegation leaves Moscow for home.

West German football team plays a Soviet team at the Moscow Dynamo Stadium.

22 V. V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, receives East German Ambassador J. König.

American agricultural delegation leaves Moscow for home.

Opening at Moscow University of All-Union Conference of university teachers and heads of faculties of Marxism-Leninism, political economy and philosophy.

Yugoslav economic delegation arrives in Moscow.

Soviet government delegation leaves Pyongyang for home.

23 Czechoslovak government delegation leaves Moscow for home.

East German government delegation arrives in Moscow.

Japanese parliamentary delegation leaves Tokio for Moscow.

Group of Soviet scholars leaves Moscow by plane for England to participate in a conference on radio-astronomy.

24 Publication of exchange of messages dealing with the visit of a Belgian parliamentary delegation to the Soviet Union.

M. P. Tarasov, Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, receives the Egyptian Ambassador to the USSR.

New Belgian Ambassador arrives in Moscow.

25 Publication of exchange of messages between the Supreme Soviet and the French parliament on the visit of a French parliamentary delegation to the USSR.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet ratifies the agreement on transit questions between the Soviet and Afghan governments.

Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Tarasov receives J. König, East German Ambassador to the USSR.

27 Agreement signed in Kabul on trade between the USSR and Afghanistan for the normal yearly period.

29 Birmingham (England) City Council delegation leaves Moscow for home.

Delegation of Italian scholars arrives in Moscow.

CHANGES AND APPOINTMENTS

14 A. A. Epishev appointed Soviet Ambassador to Romania.

16 The All-Union Ministry of the Paper and Wood-Processing Industry is made a Union-Republic Ministry of the Paper and Wood-Processing Industry.

A Union-Republic Ministry of the Paper and Wood-Processing Industry of the Ukrainian SSR is formed.

23 V. A. Valkov relieved of his duties as Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia.

N. P. Firyubin relieved of his duties as Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and appointed Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia.

Contributors to this Issue

N. Y. Galay, military historian and journalist; former officer of the White Army; graduate of the Russian General Staff College Abroad; in World War II officer of the French Foreign Legion; 1941—45 battalion commander with the Vlasov Army.

V. P. von Poletika, professor of geography and agricultural meteorology and chief of Agrarian Research Bureau for Eastern Countries at University of Bonn; former professor at universities of St. Petersburg and Berlin.

ERRATUM

In the July issue of the *Bulletin*, page 42, line 29 should read . . . the first Soviet four-engine jet passenger plane . . .

The Institute also publishes the VESTNIK, a quarterly journal devoted to Soviet problems, as well as reviews and monographs in the various languages of the Soviet Union and the free world. Scholars interested in the Institute's publications are invited to write to:

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